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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE JUDICIARY AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Report Submitted by the American National Section, AIDP
B.J. George, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
This Article generally addresses the relations between the "organization
of the judiciary" and the criminal law process in the United States system
of criminal justice. "Organization of the judiciary," as defined by the
International Association of Penal Law ("AIDP"), includes all institutions
involved in the administration of criminal justice.' Where appropriate, dif-
ferences between the organization of the United States judicial system and
that of other countries are pointed out.
Specifically, this Article discusses the authorities involved in the admin-
istration of criminal justice in the United States. These authorities include
judges, laypersons, special courts, the highest courts, prosecuting authorities,
defense elements, police and various other governmental bodies. This Article
describes the methods used by those authorities, the powers of those au-
thorities, the financial support for those authorities, and relevant political
considerations. In addition, responses by authorities in the United States to
various developments in the pattern of criminal activity are analyzed.
This Article is divided into three sections. Section I provides a brief
overview of the structure of the criminal justice system in the United States,
with an emphasis on the balkanized nature of the criminal law in the United
States. Although inefficient, this balkanization is a requisite, given the
federated nature of the union. It is also the principal difference between
criminal law in the United States and that of other countries in the AIDP.
Section II focuses on the authorities responsible for enforcing the criminal
law in the United States. It points out unique aspects of the actors in the
United States criminal law process. Section III concludes this Article by
summarizing some recent congressional forays into criminal law which have
an impact on both national and international activity. While the United
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1. See 57 R1y. INT. DE Dgorr PEAL 235-40 (1986).
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States is not a likely candidate for a comprehensive body of national criminal
law, the statutes discussed in Part III indicate a desire on the part of Congress
to nationalize certain aspects of crime that transcend state boundaries.
I. INFRASTRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. Introduction
The organization of the subsidiary topics as presented by the AIDP reflects,
almost exclusively, concepts of governmental organization and functions
based on the civil or Roman law tradition. This is understandable in light
of the membership of the organization. However, in order to discuss these
topics from the standpoint of United States law and practice, the federated
system under the United States Constitution must be discussed. Because the
United States has a federal system and separate state systems, problems that
can be addressed singularly in unitary governmental systems (as exist in
France or Japan for example) through a cabinet, parliament and government
ministries must be left in the United States to a minimum of fifty five
jurisdictions. 2 Only in very limited circumstances can the Congress create
uniformity in an area by "occupying the field" through legislation,, thus
precluding the exercise of state powers. Also, if the United States Supreme
Court interprets the federal Constitution in a certain way, all states are
required to conform. 4 In fact, however, that process sets only certain mini-
mum constitutional standards affecting criminal investigations and trials and,
therefore, only peripherally affects the creation of substantive criminal law
provisions and their subsequent effectuation. Uniformity in state criminal
law, therefore, is not likely to occur as a by-product of constitutional
interpretation.
2. The 55 jurisdictions are comprised of the federal jurisdiction, the 50 states, the District
of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.
3. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977); Douglas v. Seacoast Prod.,
Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-05 (1956); Hunt,
Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53 MICH. L. REv. 407, 417-25 (1955).
The doctrine of federal preemption extends to purely civil legislation as well. Cf. Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 431 (1963) (authority of Federal
Communications Commission to regulate generally the subject of advertising to guide broad-
;aster did not override state's authority to regulate advertising).
4. This tradition is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court is
considered the final interpreter of the Constitution and federal law. To ensure the uniform
interpretation and application of the Constitution, state courts must adhere to Supreme Court
rulings on constitutional questions. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337.48
(1816); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1885) (state
courts as well as federal courts are "equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution").
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B. Legislative Competence
In the area of substantive criminal law, Congress can define crimes only
in relation to the powers delegated to it in the Constitution.s Those powers,
of course, are quite sweeping-the commerce clause,6 for example, is the
foundation upon which a large percentage of specialized federal criminal
legislation rests.7 Nevertheless, every federal criminal statute (like all other
federal legislation) must rest on a delegated power or it will be invalidated.
It is for that reason that theft alone is not a federal crime, but theft of
federal property,8 theft of funds of federally-regulated financial institutions, 9
theft by federal employees,' 0 and theft within areas otherwise subject to
overriding federal authority" are federal crimes. In addition, robbery as a
federal crime is limited to those crimes which occur in federal enclaves or
buildings, forced takings from federal employees, and robberies committed
against federally-regulated financial organizations and carriers. 2 Generally,
homicides are not federal crimes except in those cases in which the victims
1) are found within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States;" 2) are officials or employees of the United States; 4 or, 3)
are foreign officials, official guests or internationally protected persons.Y
The corollary to the limited power of federal government is, of course,
that each state'6 has the power to legislate a plenary criminal code and can
include in it anything that does not 1) interfere with the foreign relations of
the United States;' 7 2) impinge upon the exercise of a paramount delegated
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18. But cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X (all powers not
delegated are reserved to the states and to the people).
6. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
7. An example is the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(Oct. 27, 1986).
8. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 641-643, 648-649 (1988).
9. Id. §§ 655-658.
10. Id. §§ 652-654.
11. Id. § 661 (providing that it is a crime to commit theft "within special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States"); see also Id. § 7 (defining terms).
12. See generally id. §§ 21"11-2117 (federal robbery and burglary provisions). The commerce
clause power underlies various statutes. See id. §§ 1951-1952 (governing robbery and extortion
by racketeers); id. §§ 1961-1963 (racketeer-influenced and corrupt organizations ("RICO")); 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (continuing criminal enterprise); W. CORCORAN, M. CAR SoN & T. TUCKER,
CIUMNAL PROSECUTION UNDER TE CONTINUINO CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE STATUTE-SECTION 848
or TmE 21, UNITED STATES CODE (U.S. Dep't of Justice Crim. Div. 1988) (passim).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1113 (1988).
14. Id. § 1114.
15. Id. § 1116.
16. The District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
all have their own legislative bodies, but Congress retains at least formal powers of approval
or disapproval over their statutory enactments. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1.
17. See generally Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-74 (1941) (international treaty cannot
be nullified by state enactment); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (same);
1989]
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power by Congress;'" 3) encroach on the legitimate sphere of sovereignty of
another state;' 9 or, 4) infringe upon individual rights conferred by the Bill
of Rights or other provisions of the federal Constitution. 2 Although these
limitations are significant, they leave vast areas for the exercise of state
legislative powers. In other words, plenary penal codes lie within the sphere
of state legislative competence, 2' so that ordinary crimes are normally defined
according to state statutory law and most criminal prosecutions occur in
state courts.
Finally, local governmental bodies may be authorized by a state consti-
tution and implementing legislation to pass laws of purely local application,
including substantive penal provisions. 2 However, if local laws conflict with
legislative actions at the state level,23 they are invalid under an equivalent
to the occupation-of-the-field principle. u Consequently, local criminal or-
dinances are predominantly regulatory in character governing health,21 safety,u
traffic control, 27 and local public order. 21 In this context, local units of
government are not separate sovereignties in relation to state government.
But, while local power to legislate and to enforce legislation can theoretically
2 RESTATEMENT OF FoRimoN RELAjnoNs LAW OF Tim UNiTED STATES § 722 (Revised 1987) (aliens
are entitled to all constitutional guarantees though reasonable distinctions between equal rights
protections may be permitted).
18. See supra text accompanying note 3 for a discussion of how Congress can preempt state
law in those specified areas over which it has been given power by the federal Constitution.
19. See Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909); State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H.
398, 405-07, 388 A.2d 190, 195-96 (1978); State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978).
20. This is the conceptual basis for almost the entire body of United States Supreme Court
and lower federal court precedent reviewing, and on occasion invalidating, state criminal
legislation and its administration, a corpus too bulky to cite here. See generally W. ERICKsON,
W. NEIGHBoRs & B. GEORGE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND COMMjNTS: CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE ch. 1-5A (rev. ed. 1988). Article 1, section 10, clause I of the United
States Constitution contains specific prohibitions against state legislation constituting a bill of
attainder or an ex post facto law. See U.S. CoNsT. art 1, § 10, cl. 1.
21. The most convenient source for a comprehensive understanding of American criminal
law, therefore, is the MODEL PENAL CODE (Permanent ed. with revised commentaries, 1981,
1985).
22. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6, cl. a. A home rule unit is allowed to exercise any
power deemed necessary to a functioning government. Such powers include, "but [are] not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt." Id.
23. See, e.g., City of Lorain v. Tomasic, 59 Ohio St. 2d 1, 391 N.E.2d 726 (1979); City of
Spokane v. Portch, 92 Wash. 2d 342, 596 P.2d 1044 (1979); cf. Joslin v. 14th District Judge,
76 Mich. App. 90, 96, 255 N.W.2d 782, 786 (1977) (invalidating local ordinance prohibiting
municipal peace officers from enforcing a state law because local legislative body believed the
conduct in question should be decriminalized).
24. See supra text accompanying note 3 for a complete discussion of this point.
25. E.g., ClcAoo, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODn Part VI (1983) (Health & Sanitation).
26. E.g., Id. Part IX (Public Safety, Morals, and Welfare).
27. E.g., id. Part III (Traffic and Vehicles).
28. E.g., id. Part IV (Public Ways and Places).
970 [Vol. 38:967
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be destroyed through amendments to a state constitution,29 such a result will
never occur due to the presence of various political factors.
C. Law Enforcement (Police) Competence
Under the federal system, federal law enforcement agencies have powers
only to enforce valid federal criminal statutes. 0 Federal officers only have
the arrest powers of private citizens"' under federal and -state law unless
there is special legislation conferring on them the arrest powers of peace or
police officers . 2 Moreover, there is no single federal police agency. Federal
law enforcement powers are exercised by such diverse agencies as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret
Service, the Division of Postal Inspectors, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, and the United States Customs Service, the powers of which
are defined by federal statute.3 In addition, these agencies are assigned to
different federal departments, primarily the Department of Justice and the
Treasury Department. But even within the same department, for example,
in the Department of Justice, the enforcement agencies often fall within the
supervisory jurisdiction of different divisions.34 Consequently, in many re-
spects liaison channels must be developed among these several agencies almost
as if they were agencies of different governments.
Essentially an equivalent fragmentation of law enforcement agencies exists
within the states.s Each state, of course, is a separate sovereignty, so that
in legal contemplation the police services of adjacent states (for example
New Jersey and New York) are as autonomous as if they were police forces
of different nations (for example France and Italy). Moreover, under the
traditional United States political structure, the responsibility for providing
comprehensive police services lies at the county and city level. State level
law enforcement agencies are limited to state traffic law enforcement on
29. See, e.g., ILL. CONSr. art. XIV, § 2 (power to amend).
30. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357, 1446 (1988) (Immigration and Naturalization Service
personnel); 18 U.S.C. § 3050 (1988) (Bureau of Prisons employees); id. § 3052 (Federal Bureau
or Investigation personnel); id. § 3053 (federal marshals and deputy marshals); id. § 3056
(Secret Service personnel); id. § 3061 (Postal Service personnel); 19 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988)
(Customs Service personnel).
31. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
32. E.g., MIcH. Comp. LAws AMw.'§§ 750.101-780.108 (West 1985); N.Y. C.IM. PROC.
LAw § 140.25 (McKinney 1981).
33. See, e.g., supra note 30 for a discussion of some of the statutory regulations.
34. For example, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation is formally an enforcement
arm of the Department of Justice, it may also act under the scope of powers granted to the
United States Secret Service, an enforcement arm of the Treasury Department. Compare 18
U.S.C. § 3052 (1988) (Federal Bureau of Investigation powers) with id. § 3056 (United States
Secret Service powers).
35. For a discussion on police organization and powers in the United States, see LoCAL
GOVERMENT POLICE MANAGEMENT (B. Garmire ed., 2d ed. 1982) and U.S. NAT'L ADViSORY
COmm'N ON CRIMINAL JusTicE STANDARDs AND GoALs, POLICE REPORT (1973).
1989]
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highways and roads outside the boundaries of towns and cities, 3' 6 and to the
enforcement of state criminal laws solely outside the boundaries of incor-
porated areas (towns and cities)." They may also provide technical services,
such as providing computerized records of criminals, stolen vehicles and
stolen property, 8 as well as laboratory services. However, these services are
provided only when requested by local police agencies. The great majority
of law enforcement officers in the United States, therefore, are employed
by county sheriffs or police departments and city police departments. 39
D. Competence of Prosecuting Authorities
The prosecutorial structure of the United States is balkanized as well. The
United States Department of Justice is the principal federal prosecuting
agency,40 but it is not the sole entity with the competence to prosecute. For
example, the Treasury Department, within which the Internal Revenue Service
lies, is the principal investigating and referring agency for the enforcement
of federal tax laws. 41 In addition, most powers of federal prosecution are
exercised by United States Attorneys in each federal district.' 2 Each United
States Attorney is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate,'3
and has no guaranteed tenure. Indeed, if a President is elected with a different
political affiliation than the predecessor President, there will be a complete
turnover in the United States Attorney's office in each district." Similarly,
staff members serve essentially at the pleasure of the incumbent United States
Attorney, 4 so that career staff prosecutors are relatively rare in the federal
judicial districts. The Department of Justice, acting through the Attorney
General, controls the United States Attorneys' administrative powers46 and
also establishes general policies that they are expected to follow. 7 However,
there is not the direct supervision and control in the form of a hierarchical
public prosecutorial apparatus within a ministry of justice that is standard
in most of the world.
36. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-11.1 (West Supp. 1985).
37. E.g., 24 CoLO. REv. STAT. § 33.5-205 (Bradford Supp. 1986); 29 Com. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7 (West 1975); 4 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.436 (1985); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 223 (McKinney
1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 250 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
38. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRMINAL
JusTnC "HOT" Fn.as 33-43, 47-58 (1986). States voluntarily supply information to the National
Crime Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See id. at 5-32, 4547.
39. See Id. at 5-32, 45-47.
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 515 (1988).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3045 (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 6110 (1988). A United States Attorney also has
the power to bring a complaint for violation of federal tax laws. Id.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
43. Id. § 541.
44. Cf. id. § 541(c) (President has discretion to remove any United States Attorney).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 542 (1988).
46. Id. § 519.
47. Id. § 528.
[Vol. 38:967
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At the state level, a state attorney general (usually elected, but sometimes
appointed by the governor) functions as the principal prosecuting official
and legal counsel. 41 However, the bulk of the activities of a typical state
attorney general's office is civil and administrative; the criminal division is
likely to act only when criminal activities directly affect the exercise of state
governmental powers or state officials, or where state employees are accused
of criminal misconduct.
The end result of this system is that county level prosecuting attorneys,
district attorneys, or solicitors are the principal prosecuting officials to
enforce state penal laws.4 9 In most states they are elected by county voters
at two-year or four-year intervals.5 0 As a result, the professional staff,
and perhaps the service staff as well, will change at the same time unless
they happen to be covered by a county civil-service system.' The local
prosecutor can continue to serve until removed by the voters in an election.
Normally, the state attorney general cannot intervene in the disposition
of individual cases and cannot relieve a local prosecutor from the exercise
of prosecutorial duties in such cases.5 2 Only if a local prosecutor defaults
in the exercise of official powers does suspension, removal from office,
or removal from a case become possible. Removal usually requires judicial
consideration" or administrative action by the state governor 4 or attorney
48. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-101 (West 1986); N.Y. Exac. LAw § 63 (McKinney
1982).
49. See Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957) (county prosecutor entitled to
prosecute free of intervention by the attorney general); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-106 (West
1986) (state attorney general may intervene in criminal prosecution conducted by a county
prosecutor only in special circumstances); Id. § 52:17B-109 (attorney general's powers do not
deprive county prosecutors of authority).
50. E.g., ILL. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4, cl. c.
51. The constitutional rights of staff attorneys and employees are not violated through a
summary discharge, see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), unless it is based exclusively
on the exercise of protected speech under the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
52. In New Jersey, for example, the attorney general may supercede the county prosecutor
only when requested to do so in writing by the governor, by a grand jury, by a duly-elected
county board, or by the assignment judge of the county court system. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:17B-109 (West 1986).
53. See, e.g., State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939)
(use of quo warranto proceedings). Removal should be distinguished from a disqualification in
individual cases because of bias or conflict of interest. See, e.g., In re April 1977 Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1978); People v. Superior Court (Greer), 19 Cal. 3d 255,
561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1977); State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1977); State
ex rel. Moran v. Ziegler, 161 W. Va. 609, 244 S.E.2d 550 (1978).
54. E.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63 (McKinney 1982). Compare People ex rel. Tooley v. District
Court, 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976) (unless governor intervenes pursuant to statute, the
attorney general may not interfere with prosecution by district attorney) with People ex rel.
Witche v. District Court, 190 Colo. 483, 549 P.2d 778 (1976) (after governor's order, attorney
general had right to assume prosecution of district attorney's case). See generally Pitler,
Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City-The Constitutionality and Legality of
Executive Order No. 55, 41 FoaRD.Q L. Rv. 517 (1973) (discussing governor's power to
supersede district attorney's authority).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
general." This authority must be provided by state statute.56
Municipalities of any size will have a city or municipal attorney whose
principal duties are civil and administrative in character. 7 The prosecutorial
functions of these officials generally are limited to the enforcement of local
penal ordinances such as automobile parking violations."6 Municipal or city
attorneys are not usually under the legal or administrative control of either
the county prosecutor or district attorney or the state attorney general. 9
E. The Judiciary
The judiciary in the United States is as compartmentalized as are other
organs within the criminal justice system. Federal judges are nominated by
the President and their nominations must be confirmed by a two-thirds
majority of the United States Senate.60 The federal judiciary adjudicates
exclusively federal matters. 6' State criminal matters come into federal courts
only when they present a federal constitutional issue. The most direct way
into the United States Supreme Court is through an application for certiorari
from a final decision of the last state court to hear the matter on the merits.6
Acceptance of such a petition rests exclusively in the discretion of the
Supreme Court. Four Supreme Court Justices must agree to hear it before
it can be briefed, argued, and decided.61
The avenue through which most state criminal law and procedural issues
come before the federal courts, however, is through federal habeas corpus.6
Prisoners in state custody can seek habeas corpus by alleging that they are
being held in violation of the Constitution, a treaty, or a statute of the
United States. 65 Because it requires little ingenuity to assert at least one
55. See, e.g., Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 1977) (pursuant to statute, attorney general
may exercise powers of county attorney), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978). Prosecutors
may be prosecuted for criminal dereliction of duty based on malfeasance in office. Cf. State
ax rel. Forsythe v. Coate, 171 Mont. 377, 558 P.2d 647 (1976) (charge of violating duty to
prosecute diligently, filed against county attorney, dismissed by court).
56. See, e.g., Otis, 257 N.W.2d at 365.
57. See, e.g., CmCAOO, ILL., MumcPAJ CoD § 6-2 (1983) (authorizing mayor's appointment
of corporation counsel).
58. Cf. id. §§ 6-6 to-7 (corporation counsel has power to enforce ordinances).
59. Cf. id. § 6-2 (office of corporation counsel, which heads Chicago's law department,
shall be appointed by mayor).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
61. Id. art. Ill, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1362 (1988).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1988); Sup. CT. R. 17. If a state is a party to litigation under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, as it does over cases affecting
ambassadors and other ministers. U.S. CONST. art. I1, §2, cl. 2. Because the eleventh amendment
forbids suits against the states in federal courts unless they consent, the usual case of original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court involves one state suing another, for example, to resolve an
Issue of boundaries. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 466 U.S. 144 (1984).
63. See generally J. Nowc, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTIrUTIONA LAW § 2.7 (1986)
(discussion of the "Rule of Four").
64. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1988).
65. Id. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a).
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federal constitutional infringement committed during the course of a state
criminal proceeding, a large number of prisoners file these actions annually,
and cause a substantial burden to the federal courts." However, the writ
may be rendered unavailable by statute,6 7 or through tightened procedures
to control abuse of the writ."
The overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions are adjudicated in
state courts.69 In contrast to the other governmental organs described above,
each state has a single state court system. Depending on the state, the
funding for a state's component trial courts may come primarily from county
budgets.70 In many states, trial judges are elected at the county level;71 their
terms of office, however, are usually longer than those of county officials. 72
The extent of administrative supervision by the highest state court over
judges of inferior courts differs significantly from state to state,73 but in
66. The Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983-1985 (1988), also can be used
to assert infringements of federal constitutional rights on the part of officials of state and local
governmental entities. However, such litigation almost always addresses either law enforcement
practices or the treatment of detainees or convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985) (involving the use of deadly force to effectuate felony arrests); Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (holding constitutional jail's policies of denying pretrial
detainees visits and conducting irregular searches of cells); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1982) (involving life-endangering "chokehold" used against misdemeanants); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (holding constitutional double ceiling of prisoners in maximum
security prison).
67. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, provides that the writ cannot be "suspended" except in
cases of rebellion or invasion when the public safety may require it. A plenary post-conviction
review proceeding, such as the federal procedure authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), avoids
the problem by specifying that habeas corpus is not to be used unless the relief available under
the special proceeding is inadequate in comparison with the habeas remedy-which it never is.
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
68. The Supreme Court has used certain aspects of the statutory habeas corpus system to
restrict unduly easy access to federal courts by state prisoners: 1) the exhaustion of remedies
requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257-60 (1986); 2) the preclusion
of issues that could have been litigated under a state procedure allowing a full and fair
opportunity to do so, Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1986); Cardwell v.
Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983) (per curiam); and a disability to relitigate fact issues that have
been recently litigated fully before state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1985); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432-36 (1983); Sumner v.
Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 596-98 (1982).
69. Cf. BUREAU OP JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. oF JUSTICE, Raoar To TH NATION ON
CRnm AND JusTicE: THE DATA 55 (1983) [hereinafter CRIE AND JusnCE RPoaRT] (prosecution
is predominantly a state and local function).
70. While funding at the municipal level for the criminal justice system is on a decline,
county and state governments still shoulder the majority of the cost to maintain state courts.
Id. at 88-89.
71. See generally U.S. NAT'L ADvisoRY COmm'N ON CRINAL. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GoAus, CoUirS REPORT 147-49 (1973) [hereinafter GoAms COURTS REPORT]; INsTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMmNSTRATioN, GUIDE TO COURT SYsTEms 17-27 (5th ed. 1971).
72. See GoAts CouRTs REPORT, supra note 71, at 150-51.
73. See generally INsTITUTE or JUDICIAL ADmmisTRATIoN, STANDARDS REI.ATINO TO COURT
OROANIZATION AND AMUNTRATION 18-25 (1980).
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most states it does not approximate that which ministries of justice exercise
over courts and judges in other countries.
Many municipalities also have their own courts, the powers of which are
limited to the exercise of magistrate functions-for example, issuance of
warrants and preliminary proceedings dealing with arrested persons-and
proceedings to enforce municipal ordinances. However, municipal court
powers are derived from state constitutions and legislation, so that, in an
ultimate sense, they function as part o the state judiciary. Judges of
municipal courts almost always are elected; in some states they can even be
laypersons without formal legal education. 74
F. Fiscal Support for Criminal Justice Administration
Due to the complex organization of the criminal justice system of the
United States, financial support of the system is not centralized. The legis-
lative body for the jurisdiction within which an agency functions is respon-
sible for budgetary and disbursement processes." Some costs of the criminal
justice system are fixed. For example, regardless of the criminal caseload, a
certain number of judges, public prosecutors and police will be employed,
and buildings and logistical support provided for them.
Notwithstanding existing resources, crime rates in the United States are
among the highest in the world.76 Accordingly, financial outlays have in.
creased year by year. An early response to post-World War II crime,
particularly in the 1960's and 1970's, was federal and state funding to increase
substantially the numbers of police and the amount and quality of police
equipment. That response, however, apparently did not succeed in reducing
crime, or at least it proved an inadequate response to the incidence of crime.
Crime rates increased despite increased rates in the budgets and personnel
of law enforcement agencies and, perhaps more significantly, the frequency
of arrests did not increase commensurately with expanded police services.7
Similar increases in budgets and personnel occurred in public prosecutor's
offices7s and courts, 79 but again without statistically measurable consequences
74. Some states retain the historical justice of the peace system inherited from England.
Use of lay judges does not deny due process of law. See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 333-
39 (1976).
75. See generally CsuIM AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 69, at 87-101 (discussing costs of
the criminal justice system).
76. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNIFORM CR1ME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 6 7, 13, 16, 21, 24, 28-33, 36-37 (1987) (1986 data);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATIsTics-1984, 271-447 (1985); CIME AND JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 69, at 6-13.
77. See H. JACOB & R. LINEBERRY, GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO CRIME: CRIME AND
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES IN AMERICAN CIms 84-87 (1982) [hereinafter GOVERNMENTAL Rs-
PoNsEs To CRna]. The studies reflected in the report suggest that in some major urban areas,
the economies of which have been declining, additional officers were employed and police salary
levels increased without concurrent augmented expectations of better police performance, in-
cluding a greater number of arrests. Id. at 86.
78. See id. at 98-104.
79. See Id. at 108-13.
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in the form of a reduction in crime rates. In actuality, judicial backlogs
have increased rather than declined, although that might be explained by a
greater complexity of litigation, rather than a sheer rise in the number of
cases that enter the court system.80
When economic downturns occur, law enforcement and other criminal
justice entity budgets either remain unchanged or decline. As a consequence,
law enforcement agencies, in particular, have been forced to devise other
strategies to augment their budgets. These strategies include programs of
private donations to purchase needed equipment and supplies, increased
presence of vehicles and other property forfeited because of their use in
connection with controlled substances law offenses, user fees covering the
use of police personnel at privately-sponsored events like concerts and sports
contests, special assessments against convicted offenders, and reliance on
private citizen volunteers to perform certain low-risk policing functions.8 '
Based on the statistical evidence as well as anecdotal observations, doubt
has been expressed as to whether any level of governmental expenditures in
the United States would produce a significant decline in crime rates. Changes
in the social environment have made many crimes national phenomena that
are not even affected by augmented criminal justice resources.82 One such
change is the entry of many more women into the workplace, which leaves
dwellings unoccupied and exposes women to the risk of victimization outside
the home. In addition, altered population patterns and movements create
opportunity for crime, and rising affluence increases the supply of portable
property vulnerable to theft.
Because crime now occurs in patterns that transcend city, county and state
boundaries, a nationalized criminal justice system might, at least in theory,
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of crime control programs." Such
a dramatic shift, however, is impossible as long as the federated system of
the United States remains in force. It is highly unlikely that the basic
constitutional system that reached its bicentennial year in 1987 will be
scrapped in an effort to combat high crime rates.
II. CiumNAL Jusncu SYsTEM AuToRn'ms AND THEm ROLES
A. Selection of Judges
The governmental structure of the multiple political entities constituting
the United States also affects the selection of judges. As noted, federal
judges are nominated by the President and their nominations must bd
80. See id. at 91-92, 113.
81. See generally L. STELLwAoEN & K. WYLIE, STRATEOmS FOR SUPPLEMENTING THE PoLICE
BUDGrE (1985).
82. See Gov iMarETA RESPONSES TO CRIME, supra note 77, at 123 24. "Certainly there is
no evidence that merely spending more resources on policing is likely to make a major change
in our crime problem." Id. at 128.
83. See id. at 129-30.
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confirmed by a two-thirds majority vote of the United States Senate." Some
states also provide for judicial appointments by governors, at least to fill
vacancies brought about by deaths, early retirements, or resignations by
incumbent judges1s However, in most such jurisdictions, the persons given
interim judicial appointments must at some relatively early time be voted
new terms at a general election. s6 In the remainder of American states, all
judges are elected to office at special or general elections.' 7
The mechanism of judicial election differs from state to state." In some
states, political parties nominate judges, so that contested judicial elections
along party lines are standard.' 9 In others, the judicial election is nonpartisan;
candidates for judicial office must present nominating petitions signed by a
requisite number of registered voters, although incumbent judges may be
allowed to stand for reelection without having to repeat the nominating
petition process and sometimes benefit from the designation of "incumbent"
on the judicial ballot2. In still others, the so-called "Missouri plan" is in
force, in which a special commission presents three names to the governor
from which the governor selects one.9' Thereafter, the incumbent faces
periodic voter review, at which voters respond affirmatively or negatively to
the proposition: "Shall Judge X be retained in office?"' '
It is evident that an electoral system has a significant, although statistically
unmeasurable, impact on the independence of the judiciary in deciding
sensitive or difficult criminal cases. Judges who face an impending reelection
are under subtle pressures to avoid judicial rulings that may cause their
electoral opponents to characterize them as "soft on crime," or opposed to
the maintenance of law and order.93 A recent illustration is the rejection by
a majority of California voters of the continuation in office of the Chief
Justice and two associate justices of the California Supreme Court. This
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (citing U.S. CoNs1r. art. I, § 2, cl. 2).
85. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (providing that governor shall fill vacancies in
the office of judge caused by death, removal, or resignation); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 27
(providing that governor may appoint extraordinary terms of Supreme Court when, in his or
her opinion, the public interest so requires); N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 400.7 (McKinney Supp. 1987)
(providing that the governor may fill a vacancy of an elective county office which occurs for
any reason other than expiration of term).
86. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-13-6-1 (Burns 1988).
87. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of the election of
judges.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Tsx. CONST. art. V, § 6.
90. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-14-212 (1987).
91. Normally, the list must include two names of members of the governor's political party
and one name from the current minority party because the law imposes a restriction that the
judicial nominating committee maintain a political party balance. See, e.g., COLO. CoNsr. art.
V1, § 24; Mo. CoNsr. art. V, § 25(d).
92. E.g., CoL. CONST. art. VI, § 25; Mo. CoNsr. art. V, § 25(c)(1).
93. See Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California Justice: The Campaign, the Electorate,
and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 352-53 (1987).
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resulted from the public's dissatisfaction with the justices' position in capital
cases.Y
Of course, no system of judicial appointment is entirely immune to the
phenomenon of political pressure. The controversy during the autumn of
1987 over the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork as a candidate for
Justice of the United States Supreme Court is evidence that political factors
affect the appointment and confirmation process in the federal system as
well." Nevertheless, a system of judicial appointments limits the point of
political pressure to nomination and confirmation; thereafter, judges and
justices are well-insulated against political pressures relating to specific cases
or classes of cases.
B. Lay Participation in the Administration of Criminal Justice
1. Grand Jury Proceedings
In the Anglo-American culture, the grand jury, as the inquest of prose-
cution, has an ancient tradition. 6 Although abolished in England,97 it is
constitutionally required in the federal jurisdiction8 and a minority of Amer-
ican states." However, because the fifth amendment grand jury requirement
has not been held by the Supreme Court to apply to the states under
fourteenth amendment due process of law concerns,100 a strong majority of
American states use a system of preliminary examinations conducted before
inferior court judges, followed by the filing of an information by the public
prosecutor, as the mode of instituting charges in major as well as minor
criminal cases.' 0 ' In these states, there is no lay participation during the
charging and pretrial phases of criminal proceedings.102 The system of private
prosecutions, still recognized in England,'10 under which crime victims may
retain private counsel and prosecute in the name of the Crown, does not
exist in the United States and is not likely to be instituted.104
94. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1986, § B, at 10, cot. 3; id., Nov. 27, 1986, § A, at 21, col.
1; id. Jan. 6, 1987 § B, at 6, col. 4.
95. See Marcotte, Bork to Ginsburg to Kennedy, 74 A.B.A. J. 15(1) (1988).
96. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRnDMNA PROCEDURE § 8.2 (1985) (summarizing
history of grand jury).
97. Administration of Justice Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36.
98. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. See FED. R. Cgiw. P. 6.
99. See C. WHmBREAD, CoNsrrrtrI6AL CRwdINAL PROCEDURE 510 & n.2 (1978).
100. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
101. See Davis, The Victim's Right to a Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed Model Statute
for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecution, 38 DEPAUt. L. Ray. 346-50 (1989).
102. See id. at 350-51.
103. Prosecution of Offences Act, 1979, ch. 31, § 4. See generally A. KIRALP, ENOLISH
LEoAl. SYSTEA 131-33 (1978).
104. See U.S. NAT'L INsTnUm OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTINo Domms~ic VIOLENCE: A GUaDE FOR
CRIMNAL JUSTICE AoNCmS 62 (1986); Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal
Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPPERDiNE L. Rav. 117, 152-63 (1984);
Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 526-27
(1982).
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In legal theory, grand juries have plenary authority to investigate reports
of crime, call witnesses and amass documentary and real evidence, and
determine the appropriateness of instituting criminal charges. 10 In fact,
however, in almost all instances grand juries operate under the effective
practical control of public prosecutors, so that rarely do they act contrary
to the recommendations of the attendant prosecuting authority. 1' 6 Public
prosecutors, who under American law lack independent power to coerce
cooperation from witnesses and custodians of documents and evidentiary
matters, 107 find the grand jury a useful prosecution tool. Through grand jury
subpoena and summons power, people can be compelled to cooperate in
criminal investigations.'0 Nevertheless, despite the utility of the grand jury
in such instances, the cost of preserving the institution for occasional use in
prosecution development is high.' °9 It is for that reason that a few states
have instituted a system of judicial inquiries into crime which bear a close
(although unintended) congruence to pre-charging procedures in Roman law-
based countries." 0
2. Trial Juries
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a right
to trial by an impartial jury in every criminal prosecution. The requirement
has been construed by the Supreme Court to apply to the states through
fourteenth amendment due process of law."' However, there are no juries
or lay participants in appellate proceedings." 2 The traditional size of a
common law jury has been twelve jurors, but states may reduce the number
of jurors to as few as six persons without infringing federal due process of
105. W. LAFAv & J. IsRAEL, supra note 96, § 8.1.
106. See Comment, The Grand Jury Subpoena: Is It the Prosecutor's "Ultimate Weapon"
Against Defense Attorneys and Their Clients?, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 791, 795-96 (1986).
107. The exception is the ability to seek arrest and search warrants. See FED. R. CRM. P.
4(a)-(c). 41(a)-(c).
108. See id.
109. See Amelia, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to
Prevent Conviction without Adjudication, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 463 (1980).
110. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3101 (1986); MICH. Corn,. LAWS AmN. §§ 767.3..6b
(West 1985).
111. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160-62 (1968). The constitutional right to a jury
trial does not extend to "petty" criminal cases, which embrace criminal prosecutions for crimes
punishable by imprisonment for less than six months. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 109
S. Ct. 1289 (1989); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
112. There is a limited exception to this proposition. In a few states, a form of appeal
against jury verdicts of guilt in inferior courts that do not maintain a transcript or record of
testimony is a de novo trial in a court of general trial jurisdiction, where appellants have a
renewed right to a jury trial. If the second jury convicts, further appeal is to an intermediate
appellate court composed of professional judges. See Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 136-42
(lst Cir. 1987) (appendix summarizing appellate systems for states, District of Columbia and
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). See also Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790, 798-99 (1st Cir.
1981) (lack of prosecutorial influence over sentence during de novo trial).
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law.' Similarly, although jury verdicts must be unanimous under classical
common law practice, the Supreme Court has approved the constitutionality
of state systems which allow convictions or acquittals on the basis of a
majority vote." 4
In Anglo-American criminal procedure, trial juries are the exclusive de-
terminers of issues of fact. Control over the data they consider is achieved
in two principal ways. One is by means of voir dire examination n5 through
which jurors are qualified or reviewed as to their capacity to serve in
individual cases. This is designed to expose bias or extrajudicial familiarity
with fact issues that might affect the juror's evaluation of evidence." 6 The
second method of data control is through the comprehensive body of law
known as the rules of evidence, which is used to screen the forms of evidence
that jurors are allowed to hear." 7 Moreover, because of the sixth amendment
rights which allow the defendant to be present at trial and confront the
prosecution's witnesses,"" documentary evidence cannot be assembled and
presented to jurors as an exclusive or major source of data on which a jury
verdict may rest. Jurors are to assess the evidence based on the legal principles
provided through instructions of law given by the judge before the onset of
jury deliberations." 9 If jurors disregard those instructions and convict, an
appellate court can reverse the judgment of conviction in the course of
appeal. However, if a jury acquits, the principle of double jeopardy bars
further trial proceedings. 20 Criminal trial juries are viewed to play such a
113. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970). The functions of juries bearing on
minimum size are "to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation,
and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community."
Id. at 100. For a reaction that six persons are functionally insufficient for the purpose, see C.
WhumBREAD, supra note 99, at 305-11. The Supreme Court has rejected five person juries even
in misdemeanor cases. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978).
114. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
362 (1972). However, six person juries in minor misdemeanor cases must decide by unanimous
vote. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979). Trial by jury is not required for juvenile
delinquency cases in family or juvenile courts. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548-
49 (1971).
115. See FED. R. Can . P. 24(a).
116. There is a special dimension of voir dire in capital cases, called the "death qualifica-
tion"-jurors are subject to challenges for cause if they are so unalterably opposed to the
death penalty that they would not vote in favor of that sanction no matter how overwhelming
the prosecution data in support of it. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987);
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1036 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433-35 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968).
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988).
118. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481
U.S. 200 (1987); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987). For a discussion of these holdings,
see George, United States Supreme Court 1986-1987 Term: Criminal Law and Procedure
Decisions, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 193, 266-74 (1988).
119. See FED. R. Cpiw. P. 30.
120. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 73-74 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1 (1978).
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vital role in the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence that the
jury system almost certainly would not be reduced in importance or abolished
even if the federal Constitution were amended to make juries a legislative
option.
C. Special Courts
Generally, courts of special criminal jurisdiction are not established in the
United States.' Accordingly, when one encounters, for example, special
traffic courts, they are divisions of a municipal or local court and therefore
bound by law to apply the general rules of procedure and evidence governing
trials and adjudications of minor criminal offenses. 22
There are two special tribunals that are competent in the early processing
of matters falling under highly specialized legislation. One is a special court
to receive and determine applications for electronic surveillance orders under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 23 This court has no competence
to adjudicate any form of federal criminal prosecution, however. The second
special tribunal is a division of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit which is empowered to appoint independent
counsel' 2' under the federal Ethics in Government Act.1IS However, the
division itself has no trial competence, and its members are prohibited by
the statute from participating in decisions involving the actions of an inde-
pendent counsel whom they have appointed.126
Finally, the United States Court of Military Appeals, composed of civil-
ians, serves as the highest court of review over courts-martial within the
armed services of the United States. 27 Military offenses are governed by
procedures established in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' However,
civilian employees and dependents of service personnel who commit crimes
abroad cannot be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction because court-
martial proceedings do not use juries as required under the sixth amend-
ment. 29
121. A. EnRENzwmo & P. LOuISELL, JURISDICTION STATE AND FEDSRAL 74-76 (3d ed. 1973).
122. Id. at 181.
123. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1988).
124. Originally designated a "special prosecutor."
125. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978), codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1988).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 49(b), (f) (1988). On the facial constitutionality of the statutory system,
see Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
127. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1988).
128. Id. § 801-76a.
129. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian employee serving overseas with the
armed forces is not subject to court-martial proceedings for capital offense committed during
peacetime); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian employee
serving overseas with the armed services is not subject to court martial proceedings for non-
capital offense committed during peacetime); Kinsella v. United States ex. re. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960) (civilian dependent accompanying an armed forces member overseas is not
subject to court-martial proceedings for non-capital offense committed during peacetime). See
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D. Highest Courts
Each of the American states has a high court, variously denominated a
supreme court, supreme judicial court, or court of appeals. It should be
noted that the United States Supreme Court has not held that an appeal
from a judgment of conviction is an element of either fifth130 or fourteenth"3'
amendment due process of law, although state constitutions frequently in-
corporate such a right.3 2 If, as is true in a significant number of states, an
intermediate court of appeals has been established, convicted defendants
have, under state law, an appeal of right to that court. Further review in
the highest court lies in the discretion of that tribunal.'
In contrast to the Roman law tradition, criminal defendants are considered
in jeopardy when a jury is empaneled and sworn, 3 4 so that appeals by the
prosecution against even an erroneous adjudication of innocence are not
allowed under the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause. "' However,
where trial courts resolve important pretrial motions, for example, dismissing
the pleading or suppressing evidence on constitutional grounds in favor of
generally Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (holding no sixth amendment right to
counsel exists in summary court-martial). Armed forces personnel may be tried by courts-
martial rather than civilian courts for offenses, whether committed on or off duty, even though
offenses are committed within United States territory. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435
(1987). In a court-martial proceeding there is a counterpart to the jury system. While a court-
martial proceeding is presided over by a military judge, the rest of a special or general court-
martial panel is composed of nonlegal specialists of the same or higher rank as the defendant.
See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1988) (persons subject to Uniform Code Military Justice); id. § 825
(persons authorized to sit on panel). After persons have been discharged from military service,
however, they can no longer be subjected to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. United
States ev rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
130. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1977).
131. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). A plenary appeal of right to a state's highest
court is, however, an absolute requirement of a valid death sentence. See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976) (plurality opinion). If a state creates appeals of right in criminal
cases, indigent defendants have a right to counsel under the sixth amendment. Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
132. See, e.g., CoN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; N.Y. CoNs?. art. 1, § 6; PA. Coss. art. 1, § 6.
133. See, e.g, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
134. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978). In bench trials, jeopardy attaches when the
first prosecution witness is sworn. Id.
135. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40
(1981); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). The
constitutional protection flows to defendants even if the indictment was so defective that it
would have been subject to dismissal, thus destroying the competence of the court to carry the
case to adjudication. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662 (1886). But cf. Montana v. Hail, 481 U.S. 400 (1987) (first conviction under statute not in
force at time of offense did not bar retrial). Retrial is not barred if a court sets aside a verdict
of guilt based on the weight of the evidence. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982). Prosecution
appeal is not forbidden if a trial court vacates a judgment of guilt because an appellate judgment
for the prosecution simply reinstates the original judgment; thus, the retrial condemned by the
constitutional provision will not occur under such circumstances. United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978).
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the defense, there is no constitutional bar to prosecution appeals.'36 Even in
situations where they are constitutionally permissible, prosecution appeals
must be provided for by statute.'"
As a consequence, American state high courts do not discharge exactly
the same functions of enforcing correct applications of procedural and
substantive laws as courts of cassation do in Roman law nations.' Only
errors disadvantageous to defendants can be appealed after the defendant
has been placed in jeopardy; a certain imbalance of reviewable issues there-
fore results. Nevertheless, because American constitutions protect only in-
dividuals, 39 not governmental entities, officials or employees, the skewing
of appellate issues in the direction of defense allegations alone is not viewed
as a matter of theoretical or practical concern.
The United States Supreme Court is, of course, the ultimate source of
definitive interpretations of the United States Constitution;"4 the bulk of the
exercise of that competence concerning the states rests on the fourteenth
amendment.' 4 ' Notwithstanding the national threshold presented by the four-
teenth amendment, states can set a higher standard under their own consti-
tutions and laws,"42 and in fact have done so frequently in recent years,
particularly with reference to matters of search, seizure and interrogation."3
136. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). There is also no
constitutional barrier to prosecution appeals against erroneous sentencing proceedings or im-
proper selection of the form and quantum of sanction. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S.
28 (1985); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). For federal provisions governing
government appeals against sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (1988).
137. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 770.12 (West 1978); N.Y. CIuM. PROC. LAW §§
460.10, 470.60 (McKinney 1984). Federal statute allows appeal under such circumstances. 18
U.S.C. § 3731 (1988).
138. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612-14 (1974),
that discretionary review following an appeal of right in an intermediate appellate court is
intended principally to regulate criminal trial and pretrial procedure, interpret penal legislation,
and otherwise to contribute to improvement of the legal system, and not to benefit defendants.
Id. at 616. Consequently, it refused to extend the sixth amendment right to counsel to include
discretionary appeals. Id. The Court's description of the function of discretionary appellate
review corresponds closely to cassation functions in Roman law systems.
139. Entities also have protections under the due process clauses, as do noncitizens. Self-
incrimination, in contrast, applies only to human beings. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85 (1974); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392
U.S. 286 (1968); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
140. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
141. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
142. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (state courts cannot assert
inconsistent interpretations of the federal Constitution, but are free to set higher state law
standards); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (state has power under its own law
to adopt higher standards than the United States Constitution requires). If state courts decide
a case on state legal grounds, the United States Supreme Court will not accept the matter on
review. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043-44 (1983).
143. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489, 495-503 (1977) (state legislature and judiciaries are increasingly providing
greater protections).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is a prototypical court of national consti-
tutional review.
In addition, the Court is also at the apex of the federal judicial system,
with ultimate power to interpret federal statutes, including penal legislation.I"
In that role, it frequently decides issues of exclusively federal governmental
significance, particularly when differences of interpretation or construction
have emerged among the twelve federal courts of appeals. It thus discharges
a court of cassation function in that respect.
In its federal constitutional role, the Supreme Court has manifested con-
cern over the number of state prisoner cases coming before the federal
district courts and courts of appeals in habeas corpus cases, and has taken
certain measures to control them, usually based on an interpretation of the
underlying federal legislation. 4 It has also urged Congress to create a new
level of federal court between it and the courts of appeals to resolve a
significant number of cases which the Supreme Court itself now must review
in the guise of screening applications for writs of certiorari.'" Congress has
not been receptive thus far to that proposal.
E. The Prosecuting Authorities
Federal and state prosecutors decide whether particular cases will be
rought to trial. This principle of discretionary prosecutions is so firmly
rooted in United States federal and state laws and administrative practices
that it will not likely be changed. The traditional practice of electing rather
than appointing state prosecutors makes it inevitable that political pressures
are much more substantial on prosecuting and district attorneys and state
144. The Court also has the statutory power, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-3772 (1988), to issue
rules of criminal and appellate procedure, which it has exercised in the form of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules of Appellate Procedure. Those rules, as well as the
Federal Rules of Evidence, also rest, in part, on an authorization found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072,
2075 (1988); § 2075 of title 28 also underlies the rules governing § 2254 (habeas corpus) cases
in the United States district courts and the counterpart rules for § 2255 (federal postconviction
review) proceedings. The Court's rules regulating misdemeanor trials in federal magistrate's
courts and appeals from them rest on congressional authorization in 18 U.S.C. § 3402, § 2
(1988), The rules, drafted by rules advisory committees for Court consideration and approval,
are transmitted by the Chief Justice to Congress, and go into force 90 days afterwards unless
Congress acts to reject or amend them. Congress also retains the power to limit, supersede or
repeal rules after they have gone into effect, which it exercises on occasion; substantial changes
in the Federal Rules of Evidence are perhaps the most notable exercise of that power. See Pub.
L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (March 30, 1973); Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1959, § 3 (Jan. 2,
1975); Pub. L. No. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326 (July 31, 1979). At times, Congress has legislated
amendments to the rules that amount to new legislation. See, e.g., Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (§ 209 of the Act amended FED. R.
Cium. P. 5(c), 15(a), 40(f), 46, 54(b)(3) and FED. R. App. PROc. 9(c)); § 215(b) amended FED.
R. Camns. P. 38; § 404 amended FED. R. Cmu. P. 12.2; § 406 amended FED. R. EviD. 704).
145. See supra note 68 for a complete discussion of these limitations.
146. See 69 A.B.A. J. 423, 750, 1380 (1983); N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1983, § 1, at 30, col. 1.
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attorneys general 147 than would be true if they were public officials appointed
with protected status within a ministry of justice. However, public prose-
cutors are not legally considered to be quasi-judicial officers, but rather are
exclusively executive branch officials. Furthermore, the election process may
serve to root out corrupt local prosecutors. Meanwhile, the judiciary con-
stitutes an independent third branch of government, and serves as the source
of checks against abuses of prosecutorial powers pandering to voter predi-
lections. 4 1
F. The Charging Function
As noted earlier, criminal charges in felony cases are generated in the
federal and a minority of state jurisdictions by grand juries. These grand
juries are authorized by statute to be convened by order of courts of general
trial jurisdiction, either at stated time intervals or pursuant to the motion
of a prosecuting authority. 149 Although grand juries are empowered to issue,
or cause to be issued, subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum as a means of
adducing evidence, only rarely do they do so on their own initiative. 1' ° Thus,
the evidence presented to them at the initiative of attending public prosecutors
represents the results of criminal investigations conducted by law enforcement
authorities, without formal or functional guidance from either the judiciary
or public prosecutor's offices.
Judicial review of and supervision over grand jury processes, including
the legal sufficiency of indictments, are accomplished after indictments have
been returned to the convening court and are based on motions to dismiss
or quash the indictment.' If an indictment is dismissed before jeopardy has
attached, statutes generally allow the prosecution to appeal the order dis-
missing the charges, asserting legal error.'3 2 If a defense motion to dismiss
is denied, interlocutory appeal is generally not allowed' 3 and the legal issues
advanced in the context of the motion to dismiss must abide an adjudication
of guilt (if that ensues) and subsequent appeal in regular course. The process
147. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 96-110 for a discussion of the grand jury system.
150. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 96, § 8.2, at 350-52.
151. See Costello v. Unites States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (motion to dismiss indictment based
upon grand jury consideration of hearsay testimony denied).
152. See supra note 137 and accompanying text for illustrative statutes providing for such
appeals.
153. Interlocutory appeal is allowed in federal practice on issues of denial of reduction in
bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), rejection of a claim of double jeopardy, Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and denial of a legislator's claim of "speech or debate"
immunity under U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979). Denials
of claims of speedy trial, however, are not open to interlocutory review. United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). See also Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
(1989) (denial of motion to dismiss indictment is not appealable under "collateral order"
exception to rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) that decisions be "final" in order to be appealable).
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of judicial review of the charging process is, as a consequence, indirect and
delayed.
Many states do not require an indictment as a prerequisite to prosecution.
These states allow prosecutors to file informations to commence prosecutions.
Most of these states provide that a judge must first bind a defendant over
for trial or that a defendant waive preliminary examination before an
information can be filed in felony cases.' 54 This serves as the sole judicial
control over the charging process in most information jurisdictions.'"
This is not a significant control in fact, because if a defendant is not
committed or bound over after a preliminary examination, there is no legal
barrier to the filing of a new complaint and conducting of another prelim-
inary examination, which can be presided over by a different magistrate or
judge. After a preliminary examination has been held that results in a
commitment, and an information has been filed, defense counsel can move
to dismiss the pleading on the basis of legal error. However, even if technical
error is established, only seldom is the information dismissed on that basis.
If dismissal is ordered, the asserted defect usually can be remedied swiftly
by the prosecuting authority.' 6 In addition, relatively few pretrial errors
survive for appellate review following conviction; hence, like judicial review
of the grand jury charging process, appellate judicial supervision over the
process of filing informations is remote and quite indirect.
G. Defense Services
The right to counsel is guaranteed under the sixth amendment to all felony
defendants 57 and to misdemeanants if a sentence of incarceration in any
form ensues."8 The Supreme Court has allowed indigent defendants to receive
designations of counsel at public expense."19 In addition, the right to counsel
includes a right to retain one's own attorney1 60 Therefore, courts cannot
reject qualified lawyers who appear on retainers from criminal defendants
or lawyers who are friends or relatives of defendants. 6'
154. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 96, § 15.1, at 617-18.
155. However, some states allow the prosecutor to file an information directly. This has
been allowed by the United States Supreme Court. See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586
(1930).
156. W. LAFAv E & J. ISRAEL, supra note 96, § 15.1, at 618.
157. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
158. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
159. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
160. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding right to consult with an attorney
was protected by privilege against self-incrimination when subject to custodial interrogation).
161. The principle is so thoroughly ensconced in American criminal procedure that it is
difficult to find direct authority on point. Its clearest acceptance in Supreme Court precedent
is found in the Court's application of identical standards of professional competence to both
retained and assigned counsel. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). The sixth
amendment also embraces a right to self-representation that can be asserted by defendants
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The Constitution is indifferent to the avenues by which counsel are pro-
vided for indigent defendants, as long as counsel is professionally competent
by constitutional standards. 62 A federal statute provides the power for federal
district courts to utilize either a federal public defender organization subject
to ultimate budgetary and administrative control through the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, 63 or a community defender organization
recognized by the district court in question and approved by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.'1 However, in lieu of or as a supplement
to either form of defender organization, a federal trial court can appoint
defense counsel from a panel of attorneys designated or approved by the
court or furnished by a bar association or a legal aid agency.' 6 Although a
state or federal public defender organization has the status of a governmental
entity and its attorneys have a measure of immunity to civil suit under the
Federal Civil Rights Act,'" s that is not true of private attorneys appointed
to represent indigent defendants.' 67 Accordingly, only public defender or-
ganizations directly financed from the public treasury can be viewed as
governmental entities, and will appertain to the judicial branch only if that
is provided for directly, as in federal statutes.'"
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court does not view public defenders as it does
other classes of public employees.'6 9 Aside from the source their salaries, the
relationship with their clients does not differ from that of privately retained
or appointed counsel and their clients.' 70 Moreover, although all attorneys
on occasion are characterized as "officers of the court," they are not
representatives of the state when they represent criminal defendants. '7 Public
competent to elect to relinquish representation by counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168 (1984) (involving appropriate functions of attorneys appointed as "standby" counsel);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
162. The leading cases on competence of counsel are: Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987);
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986);
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a), (b), (h)(2)(A) (1988).
164. Id. § 3006A(h)(2)(B).
165. Id. § 3006A(a)-(b). Fee scales are governed by id. § 3006A(d). For a discussion of
systems for providing defense services, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRnUNAM JUSTICE, PROVIDINo
DEFENSE SERVIcES (2d ed. Approved Draft 1979); GOAS Contrs REPORT, supra note 71, at
ch. 13.
166. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); see also West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250
(1988) (discussing Dodson). That does not extend, however, to participation in conspiracies
with other state officials to deprive defendants of federal constitutional rights. Tower v. Glover,
467 U.S. 914 (1984). The qualified immunity also does not extend to purely administrative
activities. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
167. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h)(2)(A) (1988).
169. See infra note 170.
170. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
171. In Dodson, the Court stated:
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defenders owe their undivided loyalty to their clients and, like defense counsel
generally, discharge that responsibility through procedural actions of an
adversarial nature.'7 2 This duty of loyalty is not altered by an abstract
possibility that other county or state officials, with interests opposed to those
of indigent defendants, might try to interfere with or retaliate against public
defenders who are representing or have represented indigent clients. As
lawyers, public defenders are bound by the same standards of professional
responsibility as private counsel, which means they must exercise independent
judgment on behalf of their clients.'"
The constitutional mandate of Gideon v. Wainwright'74 requires states to
provide competent counsel for indigent defendants.'" However, states cannot
in any way control the professional activities of assigned counsel, whether or
not on the public payroll,176 for to do so would deny defendants constitu-
tionally fair trials.' 77 Accordingly, federal courts are not to assume that state
or county authorities have acted contrary to federal constitutional require-
ments; defendants must plead and prove violations before federal judicial
relief can be forthcoming. 7 Consequently, systems for the delivery of criminal
defense counsel services through public defender and legal assistance offices
are and must be administered to guarantee the same independence from
improper prosecutorial or other administrative influences that retained counsel,
or assigned counsel provided by nonpublic entities, must enjoy. 17
H. Law Enforcement Agencies
As discussed above, there is no centralized police or law enforcement
agency within either the federal government or the government of any state.'10
In our system a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated represen-
tatives of the State. The system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately
advance the public interest in truth and fairness. But it posits that a defense lawyer
best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it,
but rather by advancing "the undivided interests of [the] client." This is essentially
a private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office
and authority are not needed.
Id. at 318-19 (footnotes omitted).
172. Id. at 320.
173. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1987).
174. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also supra text accompanying note 157 for a summary of the
holding in Gideon.
175. 372 U.S. at 335.
176. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 322 (implicit in Gideon "is the assumption that counsel will
be free of state control").
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Basic assistance for assigned counsel in the preparation of an adequate defense or appeal
must be provided at public expense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (state must provide
access to an expert psychiatric examination to aid in the insanity [mental nonresponsibility]
defense).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 30-39 for a discussion of the fragmentary nature of
federal and state police power.
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Moreover, the American criminal justice system contains no equivalent to
judicial police or judicial police officers endowed with official powers to
undertake certain legally significant acts, as is encountered within the Roman
law based systems. Consequently, law enforcement agencies function inde-
pendently of either the prosecutorial administrative structure or direct judicial
control. Indeed, most law enforcement activities are not closely regulated by
statute,'"' but instead are left to agency regulations and practice.' 2 Judicial
control over investigative practices such as search and seizure and interro-
gation is exerted indirectly and after-the-fact through constitutional litigation.
These constitutional challenges are chiefly based on defense motions to
exclude prosecution evidence based on assertedly unlawful police investigative
methods. 8 3 An inevitable consequence of the American governmental system
is that the police have almost unfettered discretion to divert criminal cases
out of the criminal justice system, or at least out of the track leading to
formal criminal prosecution.11
I. Ministry of Justice Intervention
Intervention by a minister of justice in the administration of criminal
justice does not exist in the United States. This is because of the fact that
the concept of a minister of justice reflects a cabinet system of government
not found in the United States. It is entirely possible that a United States
president can affect an administrative decision concerning prosecution or
nonprosecution through informal directives to or discussions with the At-
torney General, who is a member of the Cabinet and the head of the
Department of Justice. However, the powers of the Attorney General to
direct a United States Attorney to move forward with a prosecution are
doubtful,' 3 so that the hypothetical wishes of a President or Attorney
General do not necessarily generate an immediate prosecutorial response.
Moreover, even within such limits, only a directive not to prosecute would
be significant.' 6 A directive to prosecute where such an action was unwar-
181. Powers of arrest are, of course, determined directly through legislation. N.Y. Cawe.
PRoc. LAw §§ 140.25, 140.27 (McKinney 1981), is a typical state statute of this type.
182. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). In Lafayette, the Supreme Court held
that federal courts are not to lay down specific rules or regulations governing police adminis-
trative practices. Id. at 647.
183. See supra note 20 for a discussion of the limits that the Bill of Rights place on state
police investigative techniques.
184. This is a dimension of criminal justice administration addressed directly at the Thirteenth
Congress of Penal Law in 1984 and beyond the scope of this Article. See George, Screening,
Diversion and Mediation in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REY. 1, 2-5. 9 (1984)
(American national report).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47 for a discussion of the relationship between
the Department of Justice and the United States Attorneys.
186. In fact, the independent counsel (or special prosecutor) system established under the
Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
591-598 (1988)), probably would apply to the hypothetical circumstances posited in the main
text if the commission of any federal felony or misdemeanor should have occurred on the part
of any of the listed senior federal officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(c) (1988); supra note 126.
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ranted would not stand the test of the system. The return of an indictment
not based on any data would result in its dismissal, and the inability of
government prosecutors to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires
a judicial entry of a judgment of acquittal."8 If the available evidence is
sufficient to charge and ultimately to convict, courts reject claims of selective
enforcement as long as impermissible criteria of race, ethnicity or national
origin are not invoked.' s8 The principle of discretionary prosecutions by its
nature involves a possibility of political influences on decisions to prose-
cute.8 9 Notwithstanding these difficulties, the United States system of gov-
ernment will not be revised to include compulsory prosecutions in order to
forestall the possibility of political influence in decisions to prosecute. 9'
III. SPEciAL LEGISLATION GOVERNING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL
CRBM1NALITY
A. Introduction
It is unlikely that a truly comprehensive codification of federal criminal
law will occur in the next decade or so. The structure of the United States
system of justice will not allow for such a dramatic change. Congress, the
body that would be charged with designing such a scheme, is limited to
acting in those areas which the federal Constitution has designated as being
within its competence.' 9' Consequently, the individual states are left to create
the law under which most criminal activity falls.'9 A comprehensive federal
criminal code such as is employed in most civil law countries would most
likely create a more efficient system. However, the barriers to the imple-
mentation of such a system are grounded in the United States Constitution
and the jurisdictional system it creates. Nonetheless, Congress has some
ability to legislate national criminal law and has recently enacted some far-
reaching federal criminal statutes. 93
187. See FED. R. Cium. P. 29(a), (c).
188. See George, supra note 184, at 7-8 & n.38.
189. At the state level, the very limited scope of authority of a state attorney-general over
local prosecutors also means that gubernatorial influences would have minimum scope. This
essentially leaves a local prosecutor's discretion unchecked. However, only rarely is there a
county official in which powers of public administration are centered, so that influence of the
sort hypothesized in the main text is exceedingly unlikely in relation to a county prosecutor.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-56 for a discussion of the relationship between local
prosecutors and state attorneys general.
190. The system of electing judges at the state level would not exclude all possibilities of
political influence under the principle of compulsory prosecutions, but such pressures would be
much diluted In comparison with those that might be exerted on elected public prosecutors.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-73 for a discussion of elected judges' longer terms of
office and greater administrative insularity.
191. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text.
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In 1984, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.," The
Act embraces a large number of provisions which revised portions of federal
penal law and altered substantially federal sentencing procedures and criminal
sanctions. 9 However, the statute contains no comprehensive general part,
and adheres to the traditional framework of an alphabetical arrangement of
the special part rather than a topical organization. Because this most recent
foray by Congress did nothing to alleviate the organizational confusion, the
present federal criminal code is likely to remain substantially unaltered in
the years ahead, despite the obvious limitations and omissions of the federal
code.
B. Economic Crimes
1. In General
White-collar or economic offenses have been a special target of federal
criminal legislation and law enforcement activities. This is because economic
crimes generally transcend state, and often national, boundaries and thus
are beyond the abilities of state criminal justice systems to investigate,
prosecute, and adjudicate. Recent changes in federal legislation are in the
direction of increased penal law coverage and more severe sanctions, rather
than alteration of the administrative structure of government to create new
agencies responsible for overseeing and executing federal law enforcement
activities. There are several major federal statutes that should be discussed
in this context.
2. Racketeering Offenses
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")'1' has
been one of the principal federal tools against organized criminal activities,
including those that involve the infiltration of legitimate enterprises by
criminal elements. Since the enactment of RICO in 1970, Congress has
steadily augmented key definitions of the statute in order to keep pace with
the changing patterns of organized criminal activity at the national and
international levels.
There are two key definitions in the statute. The first is that of "racket-
eering activity,"'19 which incorporates violations of a long list of federal
statutes including bribery, theft, embezzlement, extortion, and narcotics
offenses. An illustration of the expansion process which has been lengthening
this list may be found in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which
194. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (Oct. 12, 1984).
195. See generally B. GEOROE, COMP E nsIE CRM CONTROL ACT OF 1984 (1986 & Supp.
1988).
196. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
197. Id. § 1961(1).
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added "dealing in obscene matter" under state law as a predicate offense. 9
This addition occurred because of the congressional belief that organized
crime was substantially implicated in the pornography trade and that RICO
should reach large-scale, commercial pornography distribution operations.'"
The second principal definition is that of "enterprise," which "includes
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity." 20° The Supreme Court gave the statutory language a rather
broad interpretation so that it includes completely illegal entities and organ-
izations as well as lawful enterprises that are manipulated by criminals. 20'
The prohibited activities under RICO include:
(a) The use of the income or proceeds from racketeering or collection of
unlawful debts or the proceeds of such income to acquire any interest in
or to establish or operate any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate commerce.
(b) Use of such funds to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an
interest in or control of an enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) Conduct or either direct or indirect participation by a person employed
by or associated with an enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, in the activities of that
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of un-
lawful debts.
(d) Conspiracy to accomplish any of the above acts.-
198. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, § 1020 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1988)).
199. See generally B. GEORGE, supra note 195, at 387-88.
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
201. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981). In Turkette, the defendants claimed that they engaged in, and intended to engage in,
no lawful activities of any sort, so that they should not have been viewed as being equivalent
to a partnership, corporation or other form of legal entity. The Court, however, thought the
second clause, "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity," was intended by Congress to strike at criminal enterprises, as a way of eradicating
organized crime from the social fabric, whether an enterprise was ostensibly legitimate or
admittedly criminal. Id. at 581-85.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988). The term "unlawful debt" is defined as a debt incurred
in unlawful gambling activity or a usurious transaction, usury being defined as twice the
enforceable rate under applicable state law. Id. § 1961(6). The statute is aimed at "loan-
sharking," in which organized criminals lend money at very high rates of interest (sometimes
20% weekly, or 1,040% annually) and then coerce payment by physical violence or threats of
violence. Some small business owners who become victims of loan-sharking have been forced
to sign over their enterprises to criminal organizations. See generally U.S. P.asIDmEr's CoMM'N
ON ORGANIZED CRIME REPORT, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 452-55 (1986) [hereinafter
ORGANIZED CRIME REPORT).
The person accused under RICO must have been a principal in the racketeering activity or
collection of an unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). Open market purchases of securities
are not included if done without the intent to control or participate in the control of the issuer,
and if the securities held by the purchaser, members of the purchaser's immediate family and
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A violation of the statute carries substantial criminal penalties and serves
as a basis for forfeiture of the proceeds of racketeering activities. 3 In
addition, Congress authorized private persons to bring civil actions for up
to three times the actual damages sustained, plus litigation costs and rea-
sonable attorney's fees, against other persons who violate section 1962 of
the RICO provisions. 4 The Supreme Court gave a quite sweeping interpre-
tation to the civil damages portion of the statute in Sedima, S.P. R. L. v.
Imrex Co.,203 confirming that it can be invoked even though the Department
of Justice has not commenced or completed a criminal investigation, or a
defendant individual or entity has not been prosecuted for and convicted of
a RICO violation. 20 There has been substantial criticism of this use of the
statute by competitors, disgruntled customers, and the like, and the Depart-
ment of Justice is concerned about the risk of interference by private persons
with government criminal investigations. Bills have been introduced in Con-
gress to amend section 1964 by requiring a completed criminal prosecution,
or some level of government intervention in such private litigation.2 En-
actment of amendments in some form appears highly likely at this writing.
3. Commerce Offenses
It is a crime to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or to use any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with the intent
to: "(a) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; (b) commit any
crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or (c) otherwise promote,
manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, es-
tablishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity. . . ."M This provision
has been a frequently invoked prosecution tool to strike at organized crime
figures, some of whose acts clearly fall within the broad concept of economic
or white-collar crime."
the purchaser's other family members, accomplices do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class and do not confer the power in law or
fact to elect one or more directors of the issuer. Id.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1988). For a discussion of forfeiture proceedings, see B. GEORGE,
supra note 195, at 591-622.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). Venue and process are covered in id. § 1965. Any action,
including civil actions under RICO, can be opened or closed to the public according to the
court's discretion after consideration of the rights of affected persons. Id. § 1967.
205. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
206. Id. at 488-500.
207. See generally Note, Congress Responds to Sedima: Is there a contract out on Civil
RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rsv. 851 (1986).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1988). Unlawful activity is defined as a business activity involving
gambling, liquor on which federal taxes have not been paid, prostitution offenses in violation
of federal law or the law of the state where they are committed, or extortion, bribery or arson
or violation of federal law or the law of the state where they are committed. Id. § 1952(b).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 1561 (lth Cir. 1986).
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4. Banking Offenses
a. Currency Reporting
Congress has been concerned for several years about the illicit flow of
currency as a result of narcotics trafficking and money-laundering schemes.
Under the legislation currently in force, federal law requires persons to report
the knowing transportation of monetary instruments valued more than $10,000
a) from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United
States; or b) to a place in the United States from or through a place outside
the United States.2 10 A report must be made as well by anyone receiving at
one time $10,000 or more with knowledge that it had been transferred into
the United States from or through a place outside the United States. 21,
However, there was no attempt provision in the original statute. Persons
had to be on the verge of boarding a plane or vessel, thus manifesting an
intent to leave the United States, before they could be prosecuted under the
1981 statute .212
Domestic financial institutions and their employees who violate the statute
could receive a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per day of violation for each
location where a violation occurred.213 Persons who fail to report or who
file false reports also could receive a civil penalty.214 A primary violator can
be punished only for a misdemeanor, '2 1 but if the contravention occurs in
conjunction with violations of other federal criminal laws or as a part of a
pattern of illegal activities involving transactions of more than $100,000 in
a twelve-month period, the crime is a felony. 216 Although the currency-
reporting statute was not originally included as a predicate offense under
RICO, 217 the RICO statute has since been amended to include currency
reporting violations as a predicate offense.218
In 1984, Congress used the Comprehensive Crime Control Act as an
instrument to strengthen the coverage of the currency reporting statute. In
that Act, Congress increased the civil penalty amount from $1,000 to
$10,000,219 So that persons who make lucrative careers in the illicit drug trade
and through organized crime would be less likely than before to write off
210. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (1988). The
1986 amendment to § 5316 increased the minimum value for required reporting from $5,000
to $10,000. Id.
211. Id.
212. See United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1982).
213. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (1988).
214. Id. § 5321(a)(3).
215. Id. § 5322(a).
216. Id. § 5322.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
218. Id. § 1961(1).
219. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (1988) (as amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, § 901(a)).
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the penalties as a cost of doing business. 2 0 In contrast, the required amount
for reporting was increased from $5,000 to $10,000 for record-keeping
efficiency purposes and to reflect inflation, which could cause legitimate
international travelers to carry with them amounts of currency greater than
$5,000.22
Congress also amended the statute to cover attempts to transport or have
transported a monetary instrument when a report is required.m Congress
intended to criminalize transactions from the time an individual takes a
substantial step toward violating the statute under circumstances evincing an
intent to violate the law. This would include, for example, loading financial
instruments onto a vessel or aircraft about to leave the United States. In
keeping with the general strengthening of coverage, Congress increased the
criminal penalties in all cases. Now, an offense under this statute carries the
penalties of imprisonment for up to five years, fines of not more than
$250,000, or both. 223
With respect to enforcement procedures, several changes should be men-
tioned. First, the revised statute confers on customs officials the powers to
stop, intercept and search, without a search warrant: 1) vehicles, vessels,
aircraft or other conveyances; 2) envelopes or other containers; and, 3)
persons entering or departing from the United States, on the basis of a
reasonable cause to believe that a monetary instrument is being transported
in violation of the statute. 224 Congress intended this revision to resolve
legislatively a split in lower federal court decisions as to whether probable
cause to arrest was necessary to legitimize searches and seizures involving
vehicles, containers and persons outbound from the United States. 5 Second,
the revised statute empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to pay rewards
to persons providing original information leading to the recovery of a civil
penalty or forfeiture (exceeding $50,000) for a violation of the statute. The
amount is twenty five percent of the net amount of the fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, or $150,000, whichever is less. 22 6
b. Money Laundering
Money laundering is a relatively new phenomenon, generated by large
amounts of cash from illegal drug trafficking, gambling, prostitution, tax
evasion and other white-collar and organized crime activities. Criminals must
220. Id. § 5316(a).
221. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmaN. NEws 3482.
222. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (1988).
223. Id. § 5322(a).
224. Id. § 5317(b).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1111 (1981).
226. 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (1988). Officers or employees of federal, state or local governments
who provide such information in the course of their duties are not eligible for rewards, however.
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"launder," that is, convert into apparently lawful assets, the cash they
acquire through criminal activity. "'7 This laundering can occur through the
purchase of interests in legitimate enterprises, or in the course of the oper-
ations of apparently lawful businesses, by which money can be processed in
the form of large salary or dividend payments or actual or apparent purchases
of commodities at inflated prices. Notwithstanding, the preferred method of
laundering money has been to move it into legitimate bank accounts, many
of them in foreign banks, and then to transfer the funds to yet other banks
from which apparently legitimate withdrawals can be made.m
As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress closed a gap in
earlier federal legislation through enactment of the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act of 1986. 29 That statute prohibits engaging in financial transactionsp0
or transporting across United States borders monetary instruments that
involve the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity,23' "(a) with the intent
to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (b) knowing
that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise
the nature, source, the ownership, or control of the proceeds of the specified
unlawful activity; or (c) to avoid a transaction-reporting requirement under
State or Federal law .... ,,3 In addition to criminal penalties, persons who
227. Money laundering has been defined as "the process by which one conceals the existence,
illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear
legitimate." ORGAN ZD CRIME REPORT, supra note 202, quoted in Burnett, Money Laundering-
Recent Judicial Decisions and Legislative Developments, 33 FED. B. NEws & J. 372, 372 (1986).
228. See generally Note, The Currency Reporting Laws and the War on Organized Crime,
20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1061 (1986).
229. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988).
230. The term "financial transaction" is defined as a transaction involving the movement of
funds by wire or other means or involving one or more monetary instruments, which in any
way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce, or a transaction involving the use of a
financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce in any way or degree. Id. § 1956(c)(4). The statute also defines "monetary instru-
ments." Id. § 1956(c)(5).
231. Specified unlawful activities is defined in id. § 1956(c)(7) to include a lengthy list of
offenses relating to unlawful organized crime activities. In particular, the predicate offenses
under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988), are incorporated by reference, but the listing extends
much more broadly to include offenses like concealment of assets in a bankruptcy case; bribery;
counterfeiting; smuggling goods into the United States; theft of government property; theft,
embezzlement or misapplication of funds by bank employees; espionage; disclosure of classified
information; kidnaping and hostage taking; bank fraud; and bank and postal robbery and
theft. Contrived bankruptcy has been a tool for organized crime to loot the assets of a legitimate
business. See E. DE FwAico, ANATOMY OF A ScAm: A CASE STUDY OF A PLANNED BANKRUPTCY
BY ORaANIZED CRIME (U.S. Dep't of Justice, L.E.A.A., Nov. 1973).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1988). The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a
scienter element-that the defendant knew the funds or monetary instruments involved in the
transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity constituting a felony
under federal or state law, but does not have to prove the defendant's knowledge that the
funds were derived from a specific illegal activity. Id. In other words, a government prosecutor
does not need to prove that a defendant shared the criminal intent to promote further unlawful
activity, conceal the source or ownership of the proceeds, or avoid a reporting requirement.
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violate the statute are also subject to a civil penalty computed as the larger
of "(1) the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments involved
in the transaction; or (2) $10,000."21
The second activity designated a crime by the 1986 legislation is engaging
in prohibited transactions. "Prohibited transactions" are defined as know-
ingly engaging or attempting to engage in a monetary transaction 234 valued23
at more than $10,000, derived from specified unlawful activity.23 6 The scienter
is that a defendant knew that the property involved in the transaction was
criminally derived property, that is, property constituting or derived from
proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.23 7 Violations are punishable by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, a fine that cannot exceed twice
the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction,
or both.23 1
Both the money laundering and the prohibited transactions provisions are
extraterritorial in sweep. The laundering statute governs conduct outside the
United States if perpetrated by a United States citizen; or, in the case of a
non-United States citizen, where the conduct occurred in part within the
United States, provided that the transaction or series of related transactions
involved funds or monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.39 The
prohibited transactions provision covers offenses within the United States,
in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,M or
offenses committed elsewhere, provided the defendant is a "United States
person" as defined by federal law.141
The 1986 legislation created a third criminal statute outside the criminal
code, designed to strengthen the reporting of transactions by financial insti-
tutions.2 2 It prohibits a person, for the purpose of evading the statutory
reporting requirements, from 1) causing or attempting to cause a domestic
financial institution to fail to file a required report of a transaction; 2)
233. Id. § 1956(b).
234. "Monetary transaction" is defined as the "deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange,
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument . . .by,
through, or to a financial institution." Id. § 1957(0(1). "Monetary instrument" is defined
through cross reference to 31 U.S.C.A. ch. 53, while "financial institution" is defined in 31
U.S.C. § 5312 (1988).
235. The term "criminally derived property" is defined as "any property constituting, or
derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) (1988).
236. Id. § 1957(a). The unlawful activity is identifical to that defined in id. § 1956(c)(7). Id.
§ 1957(f)(3).
237. The prosecution does not have to prove, however, that a defendant knew the property
was derived from a specified unlawful activity. See supra note 232 for a discussion of the
scienter requirement.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b) (1988).
239. Id. § 1956(f).
240. Id. § 1957(d). The term is defined in id. § 7.
241. Id. § 1957(d). The definition of "United States person" is found in Id. § 3077 (excluding
(2)(D)).
242. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988).
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causing or attempting to cause a domestic financial institution to file a
required report that reflects a material omission or misstatement of fact; or,
3) structuring, assisting in structuring, or attempting to structure or assist in
structuring any transaction with one or more domestic financial institu-
tions.243 The crime is a felony punishable by a fine of up to $250,000,
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.2
This statute is aimed at what is called "smurfing," in which representatives
(called "runners") of criminal organizations go to several banks and convert
large amounts of cash into negotiable instruments like cashier's checks or
money orders for amounts of less than $10,000, in order to avoid the currency
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act.245 There had been a division
of precedent in federal appellate courts over whether this was unlawful
activity, a matter settled definitively by the 1986 statute.2 4' However, the
total amount of individual "smurfing" transactions must reach or exceed
$10,000; splitting $2,000 into four transactions of $500, for example, does
not violate the statute. 247
The Money Laundering Act of 1986 also amended the RICO statute to
list among RICO predicate offenses violations of section 1956 or section
1957, and acts violating specified sections of the Banking Law.24s
243. Id.
244. Id. § 5322.
245. Id. § 5316. This provision was amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. See generally B. GEORGE, supra note 195, at 382-87. In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. 100-690, § 6184(b), 102 Stat. 4181 (in effect as of Nov. 18, 1988) (codified at
31 U.S.C.A. § 5325 (West Supp. 1989), Congress added a new provision prohibiting financial
institutions from issuing or selling bank checks, cashier's checks, traveler's checks or money
orders to individuals in connection with a transaction or group of such contemporaneous
transactions involving United States currency or other monetary instruments (as prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury) in amounts or denominations of $3,000 or more. The prohibition
does not apply if 1) an individual has a transaction account with the financial institution, and
the latter verifies that fact and records the method of verification in accordance with Treasury
Department regulations; or, 2) the individual furnishes the financial institution with whatever
forms of identification the Secretary of the Treasury requires through promulgated regulations,
and the financial institution verifies and records that information according to Treasury regu-
lations. Id. § 5325(a). A "transaction account" is defined according to § 19(b)(1)(C) of the
Federal Reserve Act, codified as 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(C) (1988). 31 U.S.C.A. § 5325(c) (West
Supp. 1989) (deposit or account on which depositor or account holder is permitted to make
withdrawls by negotiable or transferable instrument, payment orders of withdrawl, telephone
transfers or other similar items for purpose of making payments or transfers to third parties,
including demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawl accounts, savings deposits subject to
automatic transfers and share draft accounts).
246. See generally Burnett, supra note 227, at 373.
247. See S. Rep. No. 99-433 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 22 (1986).
248. The crimes are willful violation of reporting requirements on domestic coin and currency
transactions, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313 (West Supp. 1988); willful violations of reporting requirements
on foreign financial agency transactions, id. § 5314; and willful violation of reporting require-
ments on exporting and importing monetary instruments, id. § 5316.
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C. Controlled Substances Legislation
1. In General
Federal legislative efforts to prevent substance abuse and to halt illicit
traffic in narcotics go back nearly a century.2 9 Despite the expenditure of
billions of dollars during this period to support efforts to reduce demand
and interdict supplies, drug abuse continues at excessively high rates. M
Congress has responded by strengthening federal laws in 1984 through the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, again in 1986 through the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act,2'5 and most recently through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.2
The changes wrought by the first two enactments in the governmental
administrative structure went no further than to require consultation and
coordination among Cabinet level officials and concerned government agen-
cies, and did not create new overriding agencies. However, the 1988 legis-
lation included a "National Narcotics Leadership Act,""5 which created an
Office of National Drug Policy as part of the Executive Office of the
President,2 4 superseding all existing executive branch agencies responsible
for developing and administering drug control strategies. 5
Although the office and its director have a number of delineated duties,1'
the most important of them is the responsibility of establishing policy
249. The government first considered the problem of drug abuse in the 1860's. See generally
U.S. STmATE CoUicN oI DRuG AausE: FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR DRUG ABUSE AND DRuG
TRAFrFIC PVaNvTION (1975) (providing history of United State narcotics regulations).
250. See generally U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CR b, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUO
ABusE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1986).
251. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 27, 1986).
252. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (in effect as of Nov. 18, 1988).
253. Id. §§ 1001-1012 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1509 (West Supp. 1989)). The
provisions became effective Jan. 21, 1989. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1012, 102 Stat. 4181.
254. 21 U.S.C.A. § 1501(a) (West Supp. 1989). The staffing and internal structure are
addressed in id. § 1501(b)-(c). The director and highest-level officials of the office are nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, id. § 1502(a)(1), but may be removed at the
pleasure of the President, id. § 1502(a)(2). None can hold any other position in the federal
government concurrently with such appointment, id., which forestalled the implementation of
President Bush's initial desire to appoint Vice President Quayle to the position of director.
The director must report to the President and Congress not later than Jan. 15, 1990,
concerning the necessity to group, coordinate and consolidate federal agencies and functions
involved in supply and demand reduction in order to promote better execution of the laws,
provide more effective management of the executive branch, reduce expenditures and promote
economy to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient operation of the executive branch,
and reduce the number of agencies through consolidation of agencies with similar functions
and abolition of agencies unnecessary for the efficient conduct of the executive branch. Id. §
1505(a).
255. The enactment terminated the earlier National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, Pub.
L. No. 100-690, § 1007(a), 102 Stat. 4181 (1988), the National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System, id, § 1007(b), and the White Office of Drug Abuse Policy, id. § 1007(c). The Office
of National Drug Control Policy itself is subject to a sunset provision effective five years after
the enactment of the 1988 legislation. 21 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West Supp. 1989).
256. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 1502(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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objectives and priorities for a national drug control program,2", the para-
meters of which are set in the legislationY138 The basic determination to be
made is a national drug control strategy5 9 that is to reduce drug abuse,
chiefly through supply reduction2' 6 and demand reduction. 6' A specified
dimension is the establishment of "high intensity drug trafficking areas," 2
to be determined on the following criteria: I) the extent to which the area
is a center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation or distri-
bution; 2) the extent to which state and local law enforcement agencies have
committed resources to respond to area drug-trafficking problems, thereby
indicating a determination to respond aggressively to it; 3) the extent to
which drug-related activities in the area are having a harmful impact in other
areas of the country; and, 4) the extent to which a significant increase in
allocation of federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug-
related activities in the area.2 63 After such a designation has been made, the
director can direct the temporary reassignment of federal personnel to the
area, 2  take other actions specified in the provisions governing the office's
powers265 to respond aggressively to the problem, and coordinate actions
with state and local officials. 2"6
The provisions of these three major enactments are complex and directed
in large measure at domestic or internal activities; consequently, only those
aspects of the legislation relating to international trafficking will be sum-
marized here.
2. Comprehensive Crime Control Act Provisions
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act created a federal felony covering
anyone a) who has received income derived from a felony-level offense under
257. Id. § 1502(b)(1). The director is responsible for developing and submitting bugets to
the President and Congress. Id. § 1502(c). The President is to designate lead agencies with
areas of principal responsibility for carrying out the national drug control strategy. Id. §
1504(d).
258. The basic definition in id. § 1507(5) is "programs, policies and activities undertaken by
the National Drug Control Program agencies pursuant to the responsibilities of such agencies
under the National Drug Control Strategy," as determined by the President or jointly by the
director and the head of the department or agency concerned. Id.
259. See generally id. § 1504.
260. Supply reduction embraces any enforcement activity "intended to reduce the supply or
use of drugs in the United States and abroad," including international drug control, foreign
and domestic drug enforcement intelligence, interdiction and domestic drug law enforcement
including law enforcement directed at drug users. Id. § 1507(3).
261. Demand reduction includes activity other than law enforcement activity intended to
reduce the demand for drugs, including drug abuse education, prevention, treatment, research
and rehabilitation. rd. § 1507(4).
262. See generally id. § 1504(c).
263. Id. § 1504(c)(2).
264. Subject to the approval of the administrative head of the department or agency that
employs those personnel. Id. § 1504(c)(1)(A).
265. As delineated in id. § 1502 passim.
266. Id. § 1504(c)(1).
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the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act of 1970,26 b) who
is a principal in the felony transaction, c) and who uses or invests any part
of such income or its proceeds d) for the acquisition of any interest in the
establishment or operation of e) any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which, affect interstate or foreign commerce.2
Congress also addressed aviation drug trafficking offenses by making it a
federal felony for anyone to serve knowingly in any capacity as an "airman"
without a certificate authorizing him or her to do so, in connection with the
felonious transportation of drugs by aircraft.269 It also is a felony to sell or
use, or attempt to use, or possess with intent to use, a fraudulent certificate
of aircraft registration in connection with a federal or state controlled
substances felony not involving simple possession.270 If the sale of the
certificate is the basis for a prosecution, the government must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the seller of a certificate knew that the purchaser
intended to use it in connection with a drug offense. However, that require-
ment does not apply to the other offenses under the section.
All forms of controlled substances are subject to a requirement of import
permits.27' Exporters must make clear that a shipment to another country
for forwarding to a third country will meet all requirements of the law in
the intermediate country. Schedule III substances are included.27 2 The At-
torney General has been given broader grounds to deny, revoke or suspend
import registrations, particularly on the basis that a registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest and with United States obligations under
international instruments.2"7 Stocks in trade can be seized or sealed when
registrations are revoked or suspended. 274
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
Before 1986, under the Mansfield Amendment, no officer or employee of
the United States could be present at or participate in an arrest or interro-
267. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1988).
268. Id. § 854 (added by Comprehensive Crime Control Act, § 303). The United States
Supreme Court had applied the concept of "proceeds" in United States v. Russello, 464 U.S.
16 (1983), in the context of RICO: Congress adapted the Court's concept in the controlled
substances context. The term "interest" is comprehensively defined in 21 U.S.C. § 854(a)
(1988). The definition is identical to the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
269. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(q) (1988). The provision was not included in the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act, but was enacted in the Aviation Drug-Trafficking Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-499, 98 Stat. 2312 (Oct. 19, 1984), substantially contemporaneous with the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act.
270. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(b)(2) (1988). The statute also allows revocations of airman's certificates
before conviction, id. § 1903(a)(9)(A), as well as aircraft registration certificates, id. §§ 1401(c),
1401(e)(2)(A), 1401(F).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 952(b)(2) (1988) (as amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, §
521).
272. Id. § 953(e). Exporters of schedule V substances now must obtain registrations from
the Attorney General. Id. The earlier provisions covered only Schedules I through IV.
273. Id. § 958(d).
274. Id. § 985(d)(6).
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gation action by authorities in another country.21 However, the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 created amendments to the provision which allow the
Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney General to permit
participation in connection with narcotics control-related arrest transac-
tions.7 6 Participation in arrests is allowed where adherence to the general
prohibition would be "harmful to the national interests of the United
States .... -2"" Nor does the basic prohibition govern in the course of
maritime law enforcement operations in the territorial waters of another
country if that country agrees.2 8 However, a prohibition remains in place
against the conduct of or participation by United States representatives in
interrogation unless the person undergoing interrogation consents in writ-
ing.27 9
Congress determined that interdiction of foreign registry vessels outside
United States customs waters is very difficult unless the master of the vessel
or government of the country of its registry consents, a process that often
requires three or four days to accomplish. Therefore, Congress urged the
Secretary of State in consultation with other designated federal officials to
negotiate with foreign governments concerning agreements allowing United
States Coast Guard personnel to board their vessels. If a country refuses to
consider such an international agreement, the President is required to take
appropriate action, including a denial of access to United States ports by
vessels registered in that country.281 Also related to maritime activity, it is
now a federal offense for any person onboard a vessel of the United States 28'
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,2 2 knowingly or intention-
275. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1988).
276. See supra note 251.
277. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(2) (1988) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2009, 100 Stat.
3207 (1986)). The provision does not cover a federal officer or employee who takes direct action
to protect life or safety under exigent circumstances that were not anticipated and which pose
an immediate threat to United States officers or employees, officers or employees of a foreign
government, or members of the public. Id. § 2291(c)(3).
278. Id. § 2291(c)(4).
279. Id. § 2291(c)(5).
280. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 2015. The responsibilities of the Coast Guard to
conduct maritime interdictidn activities were augmented through increased appropriations,
assignment of navy aircraft to the Coast Guard, and Customs Service, id. § 3052 (called the
Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act, id. § 3051), and the assignment of Coast Guard
special personnel to navy vessels that may carry out interdiction operations, 10 U.S.C. § 379(b)
(1988) (added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3053).
281. Defined as a vessel owned in whole or part by United States individuals or public or
private entities, unless (1) granted foreign registry under the Convention on the High Seas
Article 5. or (2) a vessel once documented as a United States vessel and transferred to a foreign
national In violation of federal law. 49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(1)-(3) (1988).
282. This includes a vessel without nationality (defined in id. § 1903(c)(2)), a vessel assimilated
to a vessel without nationality under the Convention on the High Seas article 6(2), a vessel
registered in another nation if the nation of registry has consented or waived objections to
United States law enforcement, a vessel in United States customs waters, and a vessel within
the territorial waters of another nation that has consented to federal law enforcement there. 10
U.S.C. § 3(c)(2) (1988).
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ally to manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture
or distribute, a controlled substance.2 3
The 1986 law also contains a Customs Enforcement Act,2 which strength-
ens the provisions governing reports to the Customs Service of the arrival
of vessels, vehicles, aircraft and individuals within the United States."' The
penalties for violations, both civil and criminal, also have been augmented.
Under these provisions, drug traffickers who fail to report can be prosecuted
simply for this failure and must submit to inspection of belongings or goods.
Similarly enhanced penalties govern failures to have a manifest or possession
of a false manifest,28 and unlawful unloading of merchandise.2
Congress further added the new crimes of aircraft smuggling, which
includes the transportation of material by a pilot or passenger on an aircraft
with knowledge or intent that it will be introduced unlawfully into the United
States; and sea transfers of merchandise between an aircraft and a vessel on
the high seas, without appropriate permission, if either the aircraft or the
vessel is owned by a United States citizen or registered in the United States,
or if, whatever its nationality of registry, the circumstances indicate an intent
unlawfully to introduce the merchandise or substance into the United States. M
Aircraft owners have also been placed under much stricter controls when
they employ uncertified personnel, allow the installation of unlawful or
unapproved equipment, including auxiliary fuel tanks, or allow the operation
of aircraft without display of navigation or anticollision lights.Y9 Transfers
of ownership also must be reported under regulations established by the
Secretary of the Treasury. 20
283. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) (1988). Punishments are provided in id. § 1903(g) by reference to
21 U.S.C. § 962 (1988). Venue is in the federal district where the person entered the United
States or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 49 U.S.C. § 1903(f)
(1988).
284. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3101, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
285. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1433, 1436, 1459 (1988).
286. Id. § 1584.
287. Id. § 1986.
288. Id. § 1590 (added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 3120). An intent to transfer
is established prima facie by showing a transfer within 250 miles of the territorial sea of the
United States. A prima facie showing of intent to introduce merchandise into the United States
unlawfully can be made by establishing that the aircraft or vessel was operating without lights,
that the aircraft had an auxiliary fuel tank not installed in accordance with applicable law, that
the person in charge failed to give correct registry information at the request of a customs
officer or other federal government authority, that the vessel or aircraft displayed false iden-
tifying symbols or identification, that there were controlled substances on board not accompanied
by the documentation required under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs or other
international treaty, that there was a compartment or equipment on board built or fitted out
for smuggling, or that the vessel did not stop when hailed by a customs officer or other
governmental authority. 19 U.S.C. § 1590(g) (1988).
289. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(q)(1)(E)-(F) (1988) (added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3207, 100 Stat.
3207). Violations bring federal felony penalties as well as civil penalties and forfeiture of
aircraft. Id.
290. Id. § 1509(0 (added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 3401(d)).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
With respect to enforcement procedures, the Customs Service is now
authorized to obtain search warrants on expanded grounds, 29' exchange
information with foreign agencies,2 92 provide for stationing federal customs
officers in other countries and foreign customs officials in the United States
pursuant to international agreement, 293 and conduct undercover investigative
operations. 2 94 Congress also provided that rewards of up to $100,000 are
available for information concerning the killing or kidnaping of a federal
drug law enforcement agent.2 91 This was a reaction to the murder of a Drug
Enforcement Administration officer in Mexico, a crime which was not
covered by federal legislation in force at the time. Thus, the 1986 statute
confirmed United States jurisdiction in future cases of the same sort. Finally,
the Customs Law was amended to make clear that substantial compensation
may be paid to informers in connection with any customs law operation,
including one directed at unlawful narcotics trafficking. 29
4. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,297 Congress addressed primarily
administrative structural changes, 298 but also expanded the penal provisions
addressing drug trafficking and ancillary activities and strengthened collateral
sanctions.
The sweep of controls over trafficking in chemicals has been expanded
through various reporting requirements. Specifically, regulated persons299
engaging in regulated transactions involving a chemical listed in the federal
Controlled Substances Act, °° tableting machines, or encapsulating machines,
must maintain records relating to those transactions for specified periods,30'
and must report promptly 1) regulated transactions involving extraordinary
quantities of listed chemicals, uncommon methods of payment or delivery,
or other circumstances a regulated person believes may indicate that a listed
291. 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (1988) (amended by Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 3122).
292. Id. § 1628 (added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 3127).
293. Id. § 1629 (added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 3128).
294. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, § 3131.
295. Id. §§ 1991-1992 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988)).
296. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3125, 100 Stat. 3207 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 1619 (1988)).
297. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (in effect from Nov. 18, 1988).
298. See supra notes 252-66 and accompanying text.
299. The "regulated person" means a person who manufactures, distributes, imports or
exports a listed chemical (defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(33) (West Supp. 1989 added by Pub.
L. No. 100-690, § 6054, 102 Stat. 4181), a tableting machine or an encapsulating machine, id.
§ 802(38).
300. 19 U.S.C. §§ 801-866 (1988).
301. 21 U.S.C.A. § 830(a) (West Supp. 1989) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6052(a),
102 Stat. 4181). Confidentiality of the records is regulated through id. § 830(c)(2), and improper
disclosure subjects a regulated person to civil suit, id. § 830(c)(4), but civil actions may not be
brought against investigative or law enforcement personnel of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
id. § 830(c)(5). 2
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chemical will be used in violation of the federal statute;3°0 2) proposed
regulated transactions with persons whose descriptions or other identifying
characteristics the Attorney General has furnished in advance to the regulated
person;10 3) unusual or excessive losses or disappearances of listed chemicals
under the control of the regulated person;304 and, 4) regulated transactions
in tableting and encapsulating machines. 0 1 Persons who act with the intent
of evading the record-keeping requirements of the section are punishable by
fine as determined generally according to the provisions of the federal
criminal code,306 imprisonment not to exceed ten years, or both.M
In a new provision,3°0 regulated persons3°9 who import a listed chemicalP O
are required to notify the Attorney General not less than fifteen days before
any exportation or importation occurs pursuant to Department of Justice
regulations."' If the Attorney General does not notify the regulated person
to the contrary, the importation or exportation may occur, provided that
the source or recipient, as the case may be, qualifies as a "regular customer"3 11
or a "regular supplier." ' The Attorney General may bar the transaction
with other than a regular customer or supplier, or disqualify the latter, on
the ground that a chemical may be diverted to the clandestine manufacture
302. Id. § 830(b)(1).
303. Id. § 830(b)(2). The transaction cannot be completed unless the Attorney General
approves it. Id.
304. Id, § 830(b)(3).
305. id. § 830(b)(4). The Attorney General may disclose information otherwise exempted
from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988), only
(1) in connection with the enforcement of federal narcotics and customs laws, (2) when required
to comply with United States obligations under a treaty or other international agreement, or
(3) in conjunction with state or local law enforcement efforts directed at controlled substance
or precursor chemical laws. 21 U.S.C.A. § 830(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989). The term "listed
precursor chemical" is defined in id. § 802(34), while the term "listed essential chemical" is
defined in id. § 802(35).
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988).
307. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(d) (West Supp. 1989) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6052(a),
102 Stat. 4181 (1988)).
308. Id. § 971 (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6053, 102 Stat. 4181).
309. See supra note 299.
310. The term is defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(33) (West Supp. 1989) to include listed
precursor chemicals, as defined in id. § 802(34), and listed essential chemicals, as defined in
id. § 802(35).
311. Id. § 971(a), (b)(l). The statute specifies the procedures to be followed in developing
the regulations, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6052(b), 102 Stat. 4181, and regulated persons must
must provide regular reports covering their regulated customers and suppliers (see iqfra notes
312-13 and accompanying text) at specified intervals after the regulations become final, id. §
6052(b)(6).
312. The term, as defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(36), refers to a customer with whom a
regulated person has established a business relationship reported the Attorney General.
313. The term, as defined in id. § 802(37), refers to a supplier with whom a regulated person
has an established business relationship reported to the Attorney General.
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of a controlled substance.314 Those who fail to notify the Attorney General
as required by regulation are subject to civil penalty"'5 and may be punished
at the misdemeanor level for knowing and intentional violations. 16 Persons
who import or export a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a con-
trolled substance in violation of title 21 or, in the case of an exportation,
in violation of the law of the country to which the chemical is exported, or
who know or have reason to know that either form of violation will occur,
are convictable of a federal felony. 17
The new legislation added two new federal felonies as well. The first
reaches those who, while illegally manufacturing or attempting to manufac-
ture, or transporting or causing materials (including chemicals) to be trans-
ported for either purpose, create a substantial risk to human life.31 The
second prohibits traveling from an American state or foreign country into
any other American state, followed by acquisition, transfer or attempt to
acquire or transfer a firearm in furtherance of a purpose to engage in
conduct which violates the RICO statute or either federal or state controlled
substances legislation, or which constitutes a crime of violence; 1 9 contraven-
tions constitute a serious felony.31°
In terms of basic penal philosophy, the 1988 legislation includes "sense
of Congress" statements that proposals to combat the sale and use of illicit
drugs by legalization should be rejected, 2' and that consideration should be
given only to proposals to attack directly the supply of and demand for such
drugs, including proposals to strengthen and expand penalties for sale and
use to encourage greater multinational cooperation in eradication and inter-
diction, and to promote educational programs for young people.32 With
314. Id. § 971(c)(1). A regulated person can request the Attorney General in writing to covene
an expedited hearing concerning the disqualification. Id. § 971(c)(2). A transaction cannot be
carried out from or after the time that the Attorney General provides a written notice of the
order, including a statement of the legal and factual bases for it. Id. § 971(c)(1).
315. Id. § 961(1) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6053(d), 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)).
316. Id. § 961(2).
317. Id. § 960(d) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6053(c), 102 Stat. 4181). Punishment is
a fine as determined according to 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988), imprisonment for not more than
10 years or both. 21 U.S.C.A. § 960(d).
318. Id. § 858 (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6301(a), 102 Stat. 4181). Punishment is a
fine as determined according to 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988), imprisonment for not more than 10
years or both. 21 U.S.C.A. § 858.
319. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(0 (West Supp. 1989) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6211, 102
Stat. 4181 (1988)) (statute erroneously duplicated an existing subsection (f); this is the second
of them). Persons who knowingly transfer firearms, knowing that they will be used to commit
crimes of violence or controlled substances offenses as designated in id. § 924(0(2) also commit
a felony. Id. § 924(g).
320. Punishment for contraventions of either 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(0 or § 924(g) is a fine as
determined according to id. § 3571, imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both. Id. §
924(0, (g).
321. Pub. L. No. 100690, § 6201(1), 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
322. Id. § 6201(2).
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respect to penalties, the statute attempts to respond to its stated purpose
through significantly increasing the sanctions for drug-related crimes.
The most notable aspect of this increase is the reintroduction in federal
law of capital punishment in the context of the Controlled Substances Act.,"
Under the new provision,31' persons who are engaging in or working in
furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise,3 2 or are committing specified
major narcotics felonies,3 2 and who intentionally kill or stand in a specified
accessorial relationship to the killer 27 can be sentenced to death, life im-
prisonment, or imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty years.3
Similar penalties attach to those who, during the commission of, in further-
ance of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service
of a prison sentence for specified controlled substances felonies,2 9 intention-
ally kill or are accessories to the killing of a federal, state or local law
enforcement officer310 while the latter is in the performance of official
duties.33'
323. Because of the placement of the death penalty provision in Title 21, it has no applicability
to the general body of federal crimes in Title 18; a separate provision would be necessary to
reinstate capital punishment in that context, where no viable provisions currently exist. See,
e.g., United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1224-16 (9th Cir. 1984) (death penalty provisions
for espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988), currently are indperative because federal procedure
provisions do not comport with eighth amendment requirements).
324. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e) (West Supp. 1989) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(a)(2).
102 Stat. 4181).
325. Defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c) (specified violations constituting part of a continuing
series of controlled substances violations undertaken in concert with five or more others with
respect to whom the convicted person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position
or other position of management, and from which the convicted person obtains substantial
income or resources).
326. The predicate offenses are found in Id. §§ 841(b)(l)(A) (concerning traffic in narcotic
drugs contained in schedule I or II), 960(b)(1) (specified import and export activities schedule
I or II narcotic drugs). 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(1)(A) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(a)(2),
102 Stat. 4181).
327. The statutory language is "counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the
intentional killing of an individual." Id. This definition is probably too broad to satisfy United
Supreme Court limitations on the applicability of capital punishment to accomplices. Compare
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty could not be assessed against accomplice
who did not kill, attempt to kill or intend or contemplate that life would be taken; felony-
murder accomplice was not present when victims were shot) with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 157-58 (1987) (accomplices may be sentenced to death based on "reckless disregard for
human life in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death
(which] represents a highly culplable mental state").
328. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(1)(A). However, if a death penalty hearing is held and results in
a jury determination not to impose that penalty, the court must then impose a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. § 848(p).
329. The reference is to 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 958-972 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). See 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 848(e)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1989) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4181
(1988)).
330. Defined as public servants authorized by law to conduct or engage in the prevention,
investigation, prosecution or adjudication of an offense, including those engaged in corrections,
probation and parole functions. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (e)(2).
331. Id. § 848(e)(l)(B).
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The statute sets forth a number of aggravating3 and mitigating"3 factors
which the trier of fact must consider in a bifurcated death penalty hearing. 34
Such a hearing can be convened only on the basis of a timely pretrial notice
submitted by the government prosecutor.3" If a jury unanimously recom-
mends the death penalty,336 following a formal hearing at which the govern-
ment bears the burden of proving aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt and the defendant bears the burden of mitigating factors by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, 37 the court may accept that recommendation,
but neither the jury nor the court is required to impose a death sentence.3 38
An expedited plenary appeal of right lies to the court of appeals competent
to review determinations of the sentencing district court.3 9 Certain limitations
are placed on classes of capital defendants who can be sentenced to death
lawfully. 40
In addition to the death penalty, the statute provides for a mandatory life
term for convicted felons who have committed designated felonies on three
prior occasions. 34' Moreover, penalties have been enhanced substantially for
specified serious crack possession offenders.3 4 2 For those already serving time
332. Id. § 848(n).
333. Id. § 848(m).
334. Id. § 848(i)-(k).
335. Id. § 848(h)(1). The notice must specify the aggravating factors, including those set out
in § 848(n), that the government will seek to prove as a basis for imposing the death penalty.
Id. § 848(h)(1)(B). A trial court may allow amendment of the notice for good cause shown.
Id. § 848(h)(2).
336. Id. § 848(k). If the right to a jury trial has been waived, the trial court makes the
determination. Id.
337. Id. § 8480). The rules of evidence do not govern sentence-related data at the hearing,
but information may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or misleading the jury. Id.
338. Id. § 848(k). Juries must be instructed to that effect. Id.
339. Id. § 848(cq(l)-(3). One of several constitutional questions posed by the statute is whether
appeals of right should go to the Supreme Court rather than the several courts of appeals in
order to eliminate unwarranted disparity in capital sentencing. The Supreme Court has required
that the highest court of a state afford plenary review to death sentences as a means of avoiding
arbitrary and capricious invocations of the death penalty. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 465-67 (1984); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (per curiam).
The statute provides for appointments of financially-needy appellants and death-row inmates
seeking postconviction relief. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(q)(4)-(10). That includes appointment and
compensation of needed investigators, experts, etc. § 848(q)(9).
340. Sentences of death cannot be carried out against (1) persons who were less than 18
years old at the time their crimes were committed; (2) persons who are mentally retarded; and
(3) persons who, as a result of mental disability, (a) cannot understand the nature of the
pending proceedings, what the person is being tried for, the reason for the punishment or the
nature of the punishment; or (b) lack the capacity to recognize or understand facts which would
make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or an ability to convey such information to counsel
or to the court. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(1).
341. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6452(a), 102 Stat. 4181
(1988)).
342. Id. § 844(a) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181) (fine as
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or who are out on parole or a release program, possession of controlled
substances constitutes a basis for revocation of probation,43 parole,3" or
supervised release. 45
The only significant reduction in penalties applies to mandatory minimum
sentences for first offenders, such penalties no longer must be assessed for
possession offenses involving five grams or less of marijuana. '"
In terms of ancillary penalties, public housing tenants can be evicted for
drug-related or other criminal activity by a tenant, or a member of a tenant's
household, or a guest or other person under a tenant's control occurring on
or near the public housing premises in question,3"4 and federal benefits3 4' can
be denied to persons convicted of federal or state offenses based on
distribution3 49 or possession'so of controlled substances. Changes in forfeiture
provisions are principally administrative in character, but a transfer of
forfeited personal property or the proceeds from the sale of forfeited personal
or real property can be authorized to a foreign country which participated
directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of that .property,"' and
persons (other than offenders) holding ownership interests in vessels, vehicles
or aircraft cannot lose those interests through forfeiture if the offense was
committed without their knowledge, consent, or willful blindness.3 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States and its component states devote substantial sums an-
nually to crime prevention and control. If the results are not what one would
determined according to 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988), imprisonment for not less than five nor more
than 10 years, or both).
343. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3573(a) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303(a), 102 Stat. 4181).
344. Id. §§ 4209(a), 4414(g) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303(c)).
345. Id. § 3583(d) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303(b). 102 Stat. 4181).
346. 21 U.S.C.A. § 845(a), (b) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 6455-6456, 102 Stat.
4181).
347. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(d)(5) (West Supp. 1989) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101(3),
102 Stat. 4181).
348. Defined in 21 U.S.C.A. § 853a(d)(l) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5301(d)(1), 102
Stat. 4181), and applicable to convictions occurring after Sept. 1, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 5301(h).
349. 21 U.S.C.A. § 853a(a).
350. Id. § 853a(b). However, benefits relating to long-term drug treatment programs for
addiction are not to be withheld for persons who submit to or have been rehabilitated in
programs of that nature. Id. § 853a(a)(2), (b)(2). Periods of suspension of benefits also are to
be suspended if the individual completes a supervised drug rehabilitation program after becoming
ineligible for benefits, has otherwise become rehabilitated, or has made good faith efforts to
gain admission to a supervised drug rehabilitation program but have been unable to do so
because of inaccessibility or unavailability of such a program or the inability to pay for it. Id.
§ 853a(c).
351. Id. § 881(e)(E) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6074, 102 Stat. 4181) (setting forth
administrative prerequisites for such transfers).
352. Id. § 881(a)(4) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6076(a)(3), 102 Stat. 4181).
Identical amendments were made to the customs forfeiture statute. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1594(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1989) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6076(b)(3), 102 Stat. 4181).
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forecast on the basis of expenditures for the nation's criminal justice system,
much of the shortfall is the product of the United States Constitution, which
creates a system of government of multiple jurisdictions. That structure,
however, will not be altered in either concept or detail for the purpose of
combatting crime.

